VectraYX-Vision-1B: A Sub-2B Spanish/LATAM Cybersecurity Vision-Language Model with Structured Visual Reasoning and Native Tool Use
On the map: LLM reasoning → Reasoning for agents, planning and code
Abstract (arXiv)
We build VectraYX-Vision-1B, a sub-2B Spanish/LATAM cybersecurity vision-language model for offline use, and measure what limits its visual grounding. A frozen 1.04B-parameter decoder is coupled to a frozen vision encoder through a trainable projector: first SigLIP, then the Qwen2-VL-2B tower with a projector shaped for llama.cpp's mmproj export. With SigLIP, after five fine-tuning defects were repaired, a nine-field extraction gate with a shuffled-image control passes the same 2/9 fields under every configuration that keeps the encoder and adds no text hint. A frozen-feature probe explains why. Transplanting the Qwen2-VL tower with its own merger reads an 8-nibble address SigLIP never read (0.00 to 0.81 exact match). On B8 (2,040 items, 34 fields, 16 templates, shuffled-image and best-constant controls), 9 fields pass on a Qwen-tower checkpoint, all within trained template-field pairs. Screenshot tool identification (B6) sat at exactly 0.000. That was not a perception ceiling. Stock Qwen2-VL-2B transcribes the same images at word recall 0.93 at our pixel budget (0.52 with our letterboxing). Training only the projector on B6's task format and render family lifts B6 tool identification to 0.96 and recall to 0.48-0.51. Perception of rendered text is therefore present and trainable in this frozen-backbone design. The evidence is narrow. B6 is nearly in-distribution for that projector, which also forgets part of B8 (mean field accuracy 0.53 to 0.29 on a retention check); runs are single-seed, and no checkpoint yet has both. We document four harness defects, retract an earlier B6 score, and release code, benchmarks and checkpoints.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Reasoning for agents, planning and code, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning. Builds on 9 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Aug 2026.
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9 of 40 references.
References · 9
- 2024Qwen2-VL: Enhancing Vision-Language Model's Perception of the World at Any Resolutioncited by 4,151
- 2023Qwen-VL: A Versatile Vision-Language Model for Understanding, Localization, Text Reading, and Beyondcited by 2,179
- 2024Phi-3 Technical Report: A Highly Capable Language Model Locally on Your Phonecited by 1,883
- 2020GLU Variants Improve Transformercited by 1,724
- 2023FigStep: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Typographic Visual Promptscited by 368
- 2023Purple Llama CyberSecEval: A Secure Coding Benchmark for Language Modelscited by 130
- 2024ScreenAI: A Vision-Language Model for UI and Infographics Understandingcited by 97
- 2024MedVersa: A Generalist Foundation Model for Medical Image Interpretationcited by 37
- 2026VectraYX-Nano: A 42M-Parameter Spanish Cybersecurity Language Model with Curriculum Learning and Native Tool Usecited by 3
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- 2025CeTAD: Towards Certified Toxicity-Aware Distance in Vision Language Models
- 2026DE-FIVE: Detecting Malicious Image Prompts via Fourier Features and Image Vector Embeddings
- 2026Architectural Backdoors in Vision-Language Model Supply Chains via Representation Steering
- 2025Rethinking Jailbreak Detection of Large Vision Language Models with Representational Contrastive Scoring
- 2025DAVSP: Safety Alignment for Large Vision-Language Models via Deep Aligned Visual Safety Prompt