mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

CyberLLM: A Multi-Agent LLM Framework for Autonomous Detection and Guarded Response in Automotive Cybersecurity

arXiv 2608.06651 ↗First posted 6 Aug 2026cs.CR cs.SEcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) expand the automotive attack surface across source code, runtime logs, and deployment topologies, while safety constraints forbid autonomous agents from acting without oversight. This paper presents CyberLLM, a multi-agent, LLM-orchestrated framework that autonomously detects vulnerabilities and executes remediations under a formal, runtime safety guard. Detection combines a deterministic layer (regex rules, AST analyzers, and topology graph checks) with an LLM refinement pass, so a high-recall floor is complemented by high-precision reasoning. A decision agent aggregates findings, tags them with a human-centric asset taxonomy, and selects a tiered response, ratcheting its confidence with signed cross-session memory and re-planning feedback. Every action is validated against four contextual security properties and an independent action-alignment oracle before it is allowed to run, and refused actions trigger escalation and re-planning. A symmetric attack pipeline generates and replays exploits so both sides can be exercised on the same scenarios. On an independent, ground-truthed benchmark of nine original automotive ECU modules in C, C++, and Rust seeding 47 layered vulnerabilities plus clean controls, the always-on deterministic layer covers 34% of the labeled vulnerabilities at perfect precision, and adding the grounded LLM refinement and completeness passes roughly doubles coverage to about 70% (F1 0.83) while producing zero false positives on the clean controls. The results indicate that LLM agents can perform useful autonomous cyber-defense when wrapped in a deterministic, auditable safety envelope.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 7 of its 15 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 Aug 2026.

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7 of 15 references.

Closest ancestors · 2

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security19 Mar
  2. 2026Agent2Agent Threats in Safety-Critical LLM Assistants: A Human-Centric Taxonomy5 Feb

Other references · 5

  1. 2024GPT-4o System Cardcited by 4,588
  2. 2022Survey of Hallucination in Natural Language Generationcited by 2,075
  3. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
  4. 2021Examining Zero-Shot Vulnerability Repair with Large Language Modelscited by 105
  5. 2026LLM-Empowered Functional Safety and Security by Design in Automotive Systemscited by 1

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  3. 2026LLM-Assisted Dynamic Threat Analysis for Attacker-Reachable Software Weaknesses in Autonomous Vehicles
  4. 2026ClawSentry: A Progressive Multi-Tier Security Monitor for Safeguarding Autonomous LLM Agents
  5. 2026Automation-Exploit: A Multi-Agent LLM Framework for Adaptive Offensive Security with Digital Twin-Based Risk-Mitigated Exploitation
  6. 2026Toward Secure AI-Powered Penetration Testing Agents: Security Threats, Guardrails, and Architectural Perspectives
  7. 2025Guided Reasoning in LLM-Driven Penetration Testing Using Structured Attack Trees
  8. 2025Construction and Evaluation of LLM-based agents for Semi-Autonomous penetration testing