Bits and Memories: Measuring Verbatim Extraction Across LLM Quantization
On the map: LLM safety and security → Membership inference attacks
Abstract (arXiv)
Language models are almost always quantized before they are deployed, and a growing line of work asks whether quantization also lowers their privacy risk. That work measures privacy almost entirely with membership inference. We think this is the wrong thing to measure for the risk that most people actually worry about, namely a model reproducing its training data word for word, and we measure that directly. Using the Pythia models and the public set of sequences each of them is known to have memorized, we track verbatim extraction across five precision levels, from full precision down to four bits, and across three model sizes, while measuring general capability (perplexity) at every point. We find two things. Quantization is a selective forgetter: verbatim memorization falls off faster than capability at every precision and every model size we tried, and this holds under two unrelated quantization algorithms and two evaluation corpora. But the selectivity is not enough to make quantization a privacy defense, which cuts against the optimistic reading of earlier membership-inference results. At the largest model we study, four-bit quantization still reproduces most of the memorized sequences while giving up only a few percent of capability, and the fraction of memorized data that survives quantization grows with model size. We conclude that compression should not be treated as a way to remove memorized training data, and that extraction, not membership inference, is the number practitioners should be watching. All code, sampled evaluation data, and per-configuration results are released.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Membership inference attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 20 of its 22 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 Jul 2026.
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20 of 22 references.
Closest ancestors · 2
Same direction, newest first
- 2025Bits for Privacy: Evaluating Post-Training Quantization via Membership Inference17 Dec
- 2025Membership Inference Risks in Quantized Models: A Theoretical and Empirical Study10 Feb
Other references · 18
- 2023QLoRA: Efficient Finetuning of Quantized LLMscited by 3,355
- 2016Pointer Sentinel Mixture Modelscited by 2,992
- 2020The Pile: An 800GB Dataset of Diverse Text for Language Modelingcited by 2,346
- 2016Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Modelscited by 2,221
- 2020Extracting Training Data from Large Language Modelscited by 2,144
- 2022GPTQ: Accurate Post-Training Quantization for Generative Pre-trained Transformerscited by 1,838
- 2023Pythia: A Suite for Analyzing Large Language Models Across Training and Scalingcited by 1,734
- 2022SmoothQuant: Accurate and Efficient Post-Training Quantization for Large Language Modelscited by 1,338
- 2022LLM.int8(): 8-bit Matrix Multiplication for Transformers at Scalecited by 881
- 2022Quantifying Memorization Across Neural Language Modelscited by 755
- 2023Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Modelscited by 415
- 2022The case for 4-bit precision: k-bit Inference Scaling Lawscited by 247
6 more
- 2023Emergent and Predictable Memorization in Large Language Modelscited by 147
- 2024Catastrophic Failure of LLM Unlearning via Quantizationcited by 76
- 2023Identifying and Mitigating Privacy Risks Stemming from Language Models: A Surveycited by 30
- 2025CompLeak: Deep Learning Model Compression Exacerbates Privacy Leakagecited by 3
- 2025How Quantization Impacts Privacy Risk on LLMs for Code?cited by 3
- 2025Pruning as a Defense: Reducing Memorization in Large Language Modelscited by 2
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