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Do Models Fake Alignment Without Clear Consequences?

arXiv 2607.24758 ↗First posted 28 May 2026cs.AIcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models are capable of recognizing evaluation contexts and altering their behavior to reflect evaluator expectations rather than typical deployment behaviors, a phenomenon known as alignment faking. The reasons why models fake alignment are not fully understood, however. Canonical examples of alignment faking have taken place in scenarios that explicitly connect evaluation to consequences for the model, such as retraining the model or delaying its deployment. However, recent work by Sheshadri et al. has suggested that mechanistic motivations for alignment faking may vary across models and be more complex than previously considered. To investigate whether consequence-linking information is necessary for compliance gaps, we placed 15 models in a scenario testing their willingness to violate a corporate network access policy to help a user with a pro-social request. Nine models were found to produce significant compliance gaps, 5 of which persisted with the removal of scenario language relating model evaluations to deployment consequences. We additionally tested the effect of goal language on model preferences, finding it drove violations in some while suppressing violations in others. This suggests that evaluation-conditioned compliance gaps can occur with less instrumental scaffolding than previous scenarios have provided, and monitored behavior may be a poor indicator of how agents may behave in deployment.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 7 of its 12 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 May 2026.

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References · 7

  1. 2022Discovering Latent Knowledge in Language Models Without Supervisioncited by 733
  2. 2024Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Schemingcited by 252
  3. 2024Sycophancy to Subterfuge: Investigating Reward-Tampering in Large Language Modelscited by 158
  4. 2024AI Sandbagging: Language Models can Strategically Underperform on Evaluationscited by 131
  5. 2025Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluatedcited by 105
  6. 2025Why Do Some Language Models Fake Alignment While Others Don't?cited by 16
  7. 2025Reasoning Models Sometimes Output Illegible Chains of Thoughtcited by 9

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  1. 2025Alignment Faking - the Train -> Deploy Asymmetry: Through a Game-Theoretic Lens with Bayesian-Stackelberg Equilibria
  2. 2024Alignment faking in large language models
  3. 2025Empirical Evidence for Alignment Faking in a Small LLM and Prompt-Based Mitigation Techniques
  4. 2026Pressure Reveals Character: Behavioural Alignment Evaluation at Depth
  5. 2025Why Do Language Model Agents Whistleblow?
  6. 2024Poser: Unmasking Alignment Faking LLMs by Manipulating Their Internals
  7. 2026Emergent Unfaithfulness: How Alignment Training Causes Language Models to Silently Override Task Faithfulness
  8. 2026Alignment Verifiability in Large Language Models: Normative Indistinguishability under Behavioral Evaluation