ChannelGuard: Safe Models Do Not Compose into Safe Multi-Agent Systems
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
AI assistants increasingly work as teams, where one model makes a plan, others search the web, use tools, or read stored information, and another writes the final answer. This creates new security risks because harmful instructions can enter through information passed between models, not just through the user's message. Yet safety tests usually report only whether an attack succeeded, without showing what actually stopped it. We show that systems with similar safety scores can depend on very different protections. Across five agent models, attacks were stopped by a cloud provider's filter, by the model itself, or by inconsistent model behavior. This matters because protection that comes from the model or provider may disappear when either one changes. We introduce CHANNELGUARD, an application-controlled defense that checks information at each handoff without extra training or additional model calls. Across more than 5,700 test runs, it stopped all tested attacks hidden in tool outputs on all five models. On two open models, it reduced successful prompt attacks from 80% to 3% and from 77% to 10%, with no change in accuracy on 30 math problems. However, reworded attacks could still bypass the defense.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 20 of its 32 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 20 Jul 2026.
Builds on
20 of 32 references.
Closest ancestors · 1
Same direction, newest first
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
Other references · 19
- 2021Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problemscited by 10,109
- 2019Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networkscited by 9,170
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
- 2018HotpotQA: A Dataset for Diverse, Explainable Multi-hop Question Answeringcited by 3,754
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
- 2023AutoGen: Enabling Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversationcited by 1,988
- 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,947
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,420
- 2024τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domainscited by 1,402
- 2019Certified Adversarial Robustness via Randomized Smoothingcited by 1,340
- 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
7 more
- 2023Baseline Defenses for Adversarial Attacks Against Aligned Language Modelscited by 651
- 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 493
- 2023SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attackscited by 469
- 2023Detecting Language Model Attacks with Perplexitycited by 431
- 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 375
- 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 267
- 2024Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneckcited by 29
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
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