ChainMark: Model-Free LLM Watermarking with Closed-Form Calibration
On the map: LLM safety and security → Watermarking generated content and models
Abstract (arXiv)
Regulatory regimes such as the EU AI Act mandate machine-readable marking of synthetic text, but existing watermark detectors rely on the generating LM and on heuristic thresholds with no closed-form calibration. We introduce ChainMark, an active watermark that partitions the vocabulary into S states via keyed SHA-256 and forces a hard Markov transition on a fraction rho of positions; the detector replays the partition from the same key in O(n) hash operations, with no LM access. We derive a closed-form S*(n, rho, alpha) mapping a target FPR, text length, and budget to the minimum state count (Theorem 1), prove a universal robustness threshold delta* = 1 - 1/sqrt(2) approximately 29.3% that is invariant in (S, rho, n) (Theorem 2), and generalise both to any k-regular transition topology (Theorem 3). Across three instruction-tuned LLMs and four domains, ChainMark strictly dominates KGW and SWEET under translation and random-substitution attacks at matched budget; a one-corpus empirical recalibration restores the 1% target FPR on natural-language text.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Watermarking generated content and models, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 9 of its 19 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 20 Jul 2026.
Builds on
9 of 19 references.
Closest ancestors · 7
Same direction, newest first
- 2024An Entropy-based Text Watermarking Detection Method20 Mar
- 2023Robust Distortion-free Watermarks for Language Models28 Jul
- 2023Undetectable Watermarks for Language Models25 May
- 2023Who Wrote this Code? Watermarking for Code Generation24 May
- 2023Paraphrasing evades detectors of AI-generated text, but retrieval is an effective defense23 Mar
- 2023Can AI-Generated Text be Reliably Detected?17 Mar
- 2023A Watermark for Large Language Models24 Jan
Other references · 2
Built on by
Not cited yet.