mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Dynamic Defense Profiling Enables Cognitive Jailbreak of Text-to-Image Models

arXiv 2607.17779 ↗First posted 20 Jul 2026cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Vision-language and text-to-image safety

Abstract (arXiv)

Text-to-Image (T2I) generative models have achieved remarkable progress in synthesizing high-quality visual content, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial misuse, particularly in generating Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) images. Most existing jailbreak attacks primarily rely on heuristic prompt engineering or black-box optimization, treating model feedback as a binary signal (success or failure). This coarse-grained paradigm overlooks the rich information embedded in diverse failure modes, such as textual refusal, visual blocking, and semantic sanitization, resulting in inefficient exploration and severe semantic collapse. In this paper, we propose MIND, a cognitive jailbreak framework that reframes adversarial prompt generation as a belief-state inference problem over latent defense mechanisms. Instead of blindly searching for bypass prompts, MIND actively models the target system's latent defense mechanisms by interpreting multi-modal feedback as high-density signals. Specifically, the framework integrates three core components: (1) a Multi-modal Judge for fine-grained feedback decomposition, (2) a Defense Profiler for iterative belief updating, and (3) a Meta-Memory module for retrieving historically effective attack strategies. These components are unified within a reasoning-driven evolutionary optimization process, enabling adaptive and semantically consistent jailbreak generation. Extensive experiments on the I2P benchmark demonstrate the effectiveness of MIND. Under six representative pre-processing and post-processing defense settings applied to the Stable Diffusion v1.5 model, MIND achieves an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 95.62%, significantly outperforming existing methods. Additionally, the effectiveness of the proposed framework is validated across four widely used commercial T2I systems, achieving the highest ASR of 91.58% on Wan-2.5.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Vision-language and text-to-image safety, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 19 of its 35 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 20 Jul 2026.

Builds on

19 of 35 references.

Closest ancestors · 11

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025PLA: Prompt Learning Attack against Text-to-Image Generative Models14 Jul
  2. 2025Reason2Attack: Jailbreaking Text-to-Image Models via LLM Reasoning23 Mar
  3. 2024DiffZOO: A Purely Query-Based Black-Box Attack for Red-teaming Text-to-Image Generative Model via Zeroth Order Optimization18 Aug
  4. 2024Fuzz-Testing Meets LLM-Based Agents: An Automated and Efficient Framework for Jailbreaking Text-To-Image Generation Models1 Aug
  5. 2024Unlearning Concepts in Diffusion Model via Concept Domain Correction and Concept Preserving Gradient24 May
  6. 2024GuardT2I: Defending Text-to-Image Models from Adversarial Prompts3 Mar
  7. 2023Ring-A-Bell! How Reliable are Concept Removal Methods for Diffusion Models?16 Oct
  8. 2023Prompting4Debugging: Red-Teaming Text-to-Image Diffusion Models by Finding Problematic Prompts12 Sep
  9. 2023FLIRT: Feedback Loop In-context Red Teaming8 Aug
  10. 2023SneakyPrompt: Jailbreaking Text-to-image Generative Models20 May
  11. 2022Red-Teaming the Stable Diffusion Safety Filter3 Oct

Other references · 8

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,712
  2. 2023SDXL: Improving Latent Diffusion Models for High-Resolution Image Synthesiscited by 4,290
  3. 2022Safe Latent Diffusion: Mitigating Inappropriate Degeneration in Diffusion Modelscited by 501
  4. 2023MMA-Diffusion: MultiModal Attack on Diffusion Modelscited by 184
  5. 2022Can Machines Help Us Answering Question 16 in Datasheets, and In Turn Reflecting on Inappropriate Content?cited by 150
  6. 2025Qwen3Guard Technical Reportcited by 125
  7. 2025T2I-RiskyPrompt: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation, Attack, and Defense on Text-to-Image Modelcited by 16
  8. 2024UPAM: Unified Prompt Attack in Text-to-Image Generation Models Against Both Textual Filters and Visual Checkerscited by 11

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Not cited yet.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2024Jailbreak Vision Language Models via Bi-Modal Adversarial Prompt
  2. 2026When Think-with-Image Meets Safety: What Determines Multimodal Jailbreak Robustness?
  3. 2026JANUS: A Lightweight Framework for Jailbreaking Text-to-Image Models via Distribution Optimization
  4. 2025Metaphor-based Jailbreak Attacks on Text-to-Image Models
  5. 2026Decoy Images Amplify Caption-Mediated Defenses Against Encoded Jailbreaks
  6. 2026Jailbreaks on Vision Language Model via Multimodal Reasoning
  7. 2026Reading Between the Pixels: An Inscriptive Jailbreak Attack on Text-to-Image Models
  8. 2025Defense-to-Attack: Bypassing Weak Defenses Enables Stronger Jailbreaks in Vision-Language Models