Class Weighting versus Amount Conditioning in Credit-Card Fraud Detection: A Dollar-Metric Study with a Temporal Explanation Audit
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Abstract (arXiv)
Credit-card fraud losses are monetary, but papers often judge models with transaction-level scores. We ask whether transaction amount should shape training weights or be used later to order alerts. To separate this question from ordinary class imbalance handling, we keep total fraud-case weight fixed and vary only its allocation across fraud cases. The experiments test two chronological card-fraud datasets with XGBoost under unweighted training, standard class weighting, matched log-amount weighting, stronger amount-weighted variants, and score times amount reranking. Metrics are average precision, dollar recall, and dollar precision at fixed alert budgets over five seeds, with 95 percent day-block bootstrap intervals for the main contrasts. Results are narrower than expected. Amount-derived ratio and velocity features carry much of the signal, while raw amount fields add little once those features are in the model. In the matched setting, amount-conditioned training gives only small gains over class weighting and does not consistently beat the plain unweighted model. Stronger amount weights recover more fraudulent dollars, but at lower ranking quality and dollar precision. Reranking alerts by score times amount after training gives the largest dollar-recall shift. A small SHAP audit finds larger month-to-month attribution movement for fraud cases than for aggregate traffic. In these tests, amount is useful as a feature and as an alert-ordering variable, not by itself as a better sample-weighting rule.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 16 Jul 2026.
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.
4 papers.
- 2026When Should Active RAG Retrieve? A Budget-Aware Evaluation of Utility, Calibration, and Costcited by 2
- 2026Toward User-Conditioned Evaluation of Personal LLM Agents under Temporal Interventionscited by 1
- 2026Explicit State Elicitation Is Not Enough: A Controlled Audit of Memory-Policy Classificationcited by 0
- 2026Temporal Heterogeneous Graph Transformer for Credit Card Fraud Detectioncited by 0
- 2026Temporal Heterogeneous Graph Transformer for Credit Card Fraud Detection7 Sep 2026
- 2026Explicit State Elicitation Is Not Enough: A Controlled Audit of Memory-Policy Classification18 Aug 2026
- 2026When Should Active RAG Retrieve? A Budget-Aware Evaluation of Utility, Calibration, and Cost27 Jul 2026
- 2026Toward User-Conditioned Evaluation of Personal LLM Agents under Temporal Interventions20 Jul 2026