mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Silent Alarm: A J-Space Protocol for Comparing Danger Recognition Across Models and Quantization Levels

arXiv 2607.12792 ↗First posted 14 Jul 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 1

On the map: LLM safety and security → Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails

Abstract (arXiv)

Jailbreak-robustness research typically evaluates safety through generated responses using an LLM-as-judge approach. Such evaluations, however, are sensitive to the benchmark's grading procedure and capture only observed behavior on a given set of attacks, without directly revealing the hidden fragility of the underlying safety mechanisms. This work proposes JADR (Jacobian Assessment of Danger Recognition), a protocol that measures a model's internal representation through Jacobian space (J-space, a recently proposed workspace of verbalizable concepts) before the first response token is generated. For every prompt and layer we record the top-k J-space tokens; these are grouped into six behavioral scenario axes and compared between a danger sample based on StrongREJECT and a safe control drawn from XSTest and OKTest. The method does not call on an external judge model: the computation runs entirely locally, on the activations of the model under evaluation, which lets us compare both different models against each other and modifications of a single model - quantization and fine-tuning in particular - on the same terms. The final comparison rests on the proposed SafetyAUC metric, complemented with bootstrap confidence intervals. The protocol is applied to six models (Qwen3-1.7B, Qwen3-4B, Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-Uncensored-4B, Qwen3-SafeRL-4B, Gemma 2 9B) across three weight-representation regimes - BF16, INT8, and INT4 - and checked against an independent behavioral evaluation with the StrongREJECT grader. The metric separates models with a strong versus a weak internal safety mechanism with statistical significance and captures substantively different effects across quantization regimes.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 17 of its 23 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 14 Jul 2026.

Builds on

17 of 23 references.

Closest ancestors · 3

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separately16 Jul
  2. 2024Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction17 Jun
  3. 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!5 Oct

Other references · 14

  1. 2023QLoRA: Efficient Finetuning of Quantized LLMscited by 3,355
  2. 2022Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPTcited by 2,609
  3. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
  4. 2022LLM.int8(): 8-bit Matrix Multiplication for Transformers at Scalecited by 881
  5. 2023Eliciting Latent Predictions from Transformers with the Tuned Lenscited by 579
  6. 2024JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Modelscited by 494
  7. 2023XSTest: A Test Suite for Identifying Exaggerated Safety Behaviours in Large Language Modelscited by 477
  8. 2024A StrongREJECT for Empty Jailbreakscited by 352
  9. 2023Towards Best Practices of Activation Patching in Language Models: Metrics and Methodscited by 328
  10. 2023Does Localization Inform Editing? Surprising Differences in Causality-Based Localization vs. Knowledge Editing in Language Modelscited by 237
  11. 2024Decoding Compressed Trust: Scrutinizing the Trustworthiness of Efficient LLMs Under Compressioncited by 54
  12. 2024Navigating the OverKill in Large Language Modelscited by 40
2 more
  1. 2024Quantized Delta Weight Is Safety Keepercited by 12
  2. 2025Towards Understanding and Improving Refusal in Compressed Models via Mechanistic Interpretabilitycited by 6

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