mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Predicting LLM Safety Before Release by Simulating Deployment

arXiv 2607.07184 ↗First posted 8 Jul 2026cs.LG cs.AIcited by 5

On the map: LLM safety and security → Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails

Abstract (arXiv)

Pre-deployment safety evaluations aim to inform the downstream risks of releasing a new AI model. Yet most evaluations provide limited evidence about how often undesired model behavior will occur in deployment: they generally have insufficient coverage, are unrepresentative, and are generally recognizable as tests. To address these concerns, we study a simple way to simulate a model deployment: starting from de-identified conversations from a previous model deployment, we hold fixed the initial conversation prefix and regenerate the next response using a candidate model. The resulting responses can then both be audited for novel misalignments and used to estimate the prevalence of model misbehavior before deployment. We evaluate deployment simulation across four GPT-5-series deployments, using registered, outcome-blinded predictions for GPT-5.4 and retrospective analyses of three earlier releases. We find that deployment simulation produces informative estimates of post-deployment misbehavior rates and outperforms baselines based on adversarially selected production data; its evaluation-awareness point estimates were also much closer to production traffic than those from traditional evaluations. We also identify the realism of tool resampling as a central challenge for further improving predictions and share results suggesting that this challenge is surmountable even in complex tool-use settings. Finally, we show that deployment simulation can be seeded from public chat datasets and remain informative about production misbehavior rates, suggesting a path for external researchers to run deployment-grounded evaluations without access to private production logs. Overall, deployment simulation helps evaluators forecast how language models will behave in the real world and supports more quantitative assessment of deployment risk.

Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 9 of its 18 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 8 Jul 2026.

Builds on

9 of 18 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Estimating Tail Risks in Language Model Output Distributions24 Apr

Other references · 8

  1. 2023SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?cited by 3,193
  2. 2024WildChat: 1M ChatGPT Interaction Logs in the Wildcited by 598
  3. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandboxcited by 514
  4. 2025Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safetycited by 222
  5. 2025Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluatedcited by 105
  6. 2025Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Trainingcited by 71
  7. 2025Training LLMs for Honesty via Confessionscited by 19
  8. 2024Estimating the Probabilities of Rare Outputs in Language Modelscited by 15

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 5.

5 papers.