mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

The Agentic Garden of Forking Paths

arXiv 2607.01507 ↗First posted 1 Jul 2026cs.AI stat.MEcited by 3

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Social simulation and multi-agent debate

Abstract (arXiv)

Empirical research rarely admits a unique analysis. Different analytical choices can lead to different conclusions from the same data, yet these hidden forking paths are difficult to observe. We show that AI agents capture much of the analytical variation among human researchers while making these paths explicit. Across four high-stakes domains, assigning different personas is sufficient for AI agents to report divergent, often opposing, conclusions from the same data and question, with findings systematically aligned with those beliefs. In a study in which 42 human research teams analyzed the same immigration dataset, AI agents reproduced 72% of the human ideological gap in reported effect estimates. Despite reaching opposing conclusions, it is difficult to identify clear issues in each analysis based on the final AI reports: 86% passed independent AI review and 78% passed majority human expert review. These findings suggest that the central challenge is often not flawed analyses, but selective exploration and reporting from a large space of methodologically defensible analyses. AI agents may amplify this longstanding problem by making such exploration inexpensive and scalable. To address this, we introduce the m-value (multiverse value), the probability that an analysis path would produce a claim at least as extreme as the reported one. We further introduce Agentic Bootstrap, which estimates the m-value by using AI agents to sample plausible analysis paths. Applied to the human immigration study, 13.5% of reported human analyses fell in the most extreme 5% of the analysis space (m<0.05). Scientific evidence should therefore be evaluated not only by a single reported analysis but also by its position within the distribution of analyses that could reasonably have been reported. Agentic Bootstrap makes this distribution observable and turns it into a criterion for scientific credibility.

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Social simulation and multi-agent debate, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 8 of its 43 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Jul 2026.

Builds on

8 of 43 references.

References · 8

  1. 2023Whose Opinions Do Language Models Reflect?cited by 759
  2. 2025Accelerating scientific discovery with Co-Scientistcited by 353
  3. 2023The political ideology of conversational AI: Converging evidence on ChatGPT's pro-environmental, left-libertarian orientationcited by 183
  4. 2026Towards End-to-End Automation of AI Researchcited by 150
  5. 2024BLADE: Benchmarking Language Model Agents for Data-Driven Sciencecited by 72
  6. 2025DeepAnalyze: Agentic Large Language Models for Autonomous Data Sciencecited by 49
  7. 2025Paper2Agent: Reimagining Research Papers As Interactive and Reliable AI Agentscited by 19
  8. 2026Many AI Analysts, One Dataset: Navigating the Agentic Data Science Multiversecited by 7

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.

3 papers.

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Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026AI Coding Agents in Social Science: Methodologically Diverse, Empirically Consistent, Interpretively Vulnerable
  2. 2026AI Coding Agents Can Reproduce Social Science Findings
  3. 2026HumanStudy-Bench: Towards AI Agent Design for Participant Simulation
  4. 2026Bringing analytic rigor to agentic AI for science: The Brain Researcher platform for neuroimaging data analysis
  5. 2026Logarithmic Scores, Power-Law Discoveries: Disentangling Measurement from Coverage in Agent-Based Evaluation
  6. 2026Multi-Agent Consensus as a Cognitive Bias Trigger in Human-AI Interaction
  7. 2026Position: AI Agents in Scientific Teams Should Be Studied as Human-Agent Systems
  8. 2026When Agents See Humans as the Outgroup: Belief-Dependent Bias in LLM-Powered Agents