mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Fixed-Set Robustness in Programming by Example: Example Corruption and Semantic Partition Recovery

arXiv 2607.01280 ↗First posted 1 Jul 2026cs.LG cs.PLcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Programming-by-example systems infer programs from a small set of input-output examples. Robust PBE work usually models wrong examples as samples from a stochastic noise process and then minimizes an expected or empirical loss. This paper studies a different failure mode: an adversary who sees the synthesizer and chooses the examples whose corruption most damages the returned program. We formalize fixed-set worst-case corruption for finite PBE version spaces, implement exact-within-bounded-pool and heuristic corruption searches for a string-transformation DSL, and introduce version-space partition aggregation (VPA), a defense that synthesizes on disjoint example groups and votes by semantic signatures. The central claim is deliberately bounded and partly negative: low-margin PBE tasks have an adversarial robustness dimension that random-typo and noisy-PBE evaluations miss, while semantic partition aggregation helps only when the clean semantics keep a partition vote margin, which often fails on realistic tasks. Evidence from curated/generated DSL tasks, accepted public SyGuS PBE_SLIA slices, SYNTRA Playgol v2, and noisy-PBE objective baselines supports that boundary. One curated edit flips all 8 spike tasks while 200-trial typo, DSL-pool, and distance-matched random controls succeed on 10.3%, 11.0%, and 16.7%; generated margin-1 rows flip under budget 1 yet VPA recovers them; on public SyGuS the vote margin is near one, so an adaptive attacker drives VPA accuracy to zero; accepted public SyGuS slices move across exact-within-pool budget boundaries; and Playgol shows positive paired-bootstrap gaps against typo and same-pool random controls on the 141 accepted rows. A small exact-output prompt harness over 20 controlled margin-1 tasks shows the same qualitative clean-to-attacked pattern across local and API models, while it is treated as a scope check, not a broad LLM benchmark.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 37 of its 67 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Jul 2026.

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References · 37

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25 more
  1. 2016DeepCoder: Learning to Write Programscited by 145
  2. 2017RobustFill: Neural Program Learning under Noisy I/Ocited by 124
  3. 2020Deep Partition Aggregation: Provable Defense against General Poisoning Attackscited by 112
  4. 2020You Autocomplete Me: Poisoning Vulnerabilities in Neural Code Completioncited by 112
  5. 2020Certified Robustness to Label-Flipping Attacks via Randomized Smoothingcited by 103
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  7. 2022Improved Certified Defenses against Data Poisoning with (Deterministic) Finite Aggregationcited by 50
  8. 2023TrojanPuzzle: Covertly Poisoning Code-Suggestion Modelscited by 47
  9. 2025Practical Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generationcited by 35
  10. 2024Is Programming by Example solved by LLMs?cited by 27
  11. 2024Data Poisoning for In-context Learningcited by 21
  12. 2015Program Synthesis from Polymorphic Refinement Typescited by 20
  13. 2020Representing Partial Programs with Blended Abstract Semanticscited by 14
  14. 2025Exploring the Security Threats of Knowledge Base Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Code Generationcited by 9
  15. 2020Inductive Program Synthesis Over Noisy Datacited by 7
  16. 2022Automated Feedback Generation for Competition-Level Codecited by 7
  17. 2025A Systematic Study of Time Limit Exceeded Errors in Online Programming Assignmentscited by 3
  18. 2025ViScratch: Using Large Language Models and Gameplay Videos for Automated Feedback in Scratchcited by 2
  19. 2025Stitch: Step-by-step LLM Guided Tutoring for Scratchcited by 2
  20. 2026ScratchEval : A Multimodal Evaluation Framework for LLMs in Block-Based Programmingcited by 2
  21. 2026ScratchLens: Lens-Parametric Behavioral Equivalence for Scratch Programscited by 2
  22. 2021Inductive Program Synthesis over Noisy Datasets using Abstraction Refinement Based Optimizationcited by 1
  23. 2026EcoScratch: Cost-Effective Multimodal Repair for Scratch Using Execution Feedbackcited by 1
  24. 2026Raven: Rethinking Automated Assessment for Scratch Programs via Video-Grounded Evaluationcited by 1
  25. 2026ScratchWorld: Evaluating If World Models Compute Executable Consequencescited by 1

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