mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Harness-MU: A Safe, Governed, and Effective Harness for Multi-User LLM Agents

arXiv 2606.21856 ↗First posted 20 Jun 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 1

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

The increasing deployment of large language model (LLM) agents in collaborative workflows demands robust multi-user, multi-principal interaction mechanisms capable of enforcing access permissions, resolving authoritative conflicts, and preventing unauthorized data disclosure. However, a fundamental mismatch exists between the single-user training paradigm of contemporary LLMs and the hard constraints required for multi-principal governance, rendering probabilistic, prompt-based safeguards vulnerable under multi-turn adversarial interactions.Our key insight is that governance constraints -- who is authorized, what is restricted, and whose instructions take precedence -- are deterministic runtime variables that should be enforced by execution hooks rather than entrusted to the LLM. We present Harness-MU, the first model-agnostic, zero-tuning infrastructure framework for multi-user LLM agents. By decoupling language generation from safety orchestration, Harness-MU guarantees unbreakable permission boundaries while maximizing compliant demand satisfaction. Across four frontier open-weight and proprietary models on the textitMuses-Bench benchmark, Harness-MU achieves the goal of privacy preservation across all access-control attacks, outperforming the standard baseline by 0.28--0.39 in utility score and improving instruction-following accuracy by up to 48.9 percentage points. Harness-MU advances the philosophy of textitHarness Engineering, establishing that systematic infrastructure is essential for solving LLM multi-principal governance challenges. The code and data are available at https://github.com/YuanJrShiuan/Harness-MulUser.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 14 of its 37 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 20 Jun 2026.

Builds on

14 of 37 references.

References · 14

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,971
  2. 2020Extracting Training Data from Large Language Modelscited by 2,189
  3. 2026DeepSeek-V4: Towards Highly Efficient Million-Token Context Intelligencecited by 1,040
  4. 2024Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attackcited by 390
  5. 2026Meta-Harness: End-to-End Optimization of Model Harnessescited by 309
  6. 2025Collaborative Memory: Multi-User Memory Sharing in LLM Agents with Dynamic Access Controlcited by 61
  7. 2026Dive into Claude Code: The Design Space of Today's and Future AI Agent Systemscited by 38
  8. 2025Multi-Agent Coordination across Diverse Applications: A Surveycited by 37
  9. 2025Fraud-R1 : A Multi-Round Benchmark for Assessing the Robustness of LLM Against Augmented Fraud and Phishing Inducementscited by 32
  10. 2025Indirect Prompt Injections: Are Firewalls All You Need, or Stronger Benchmarks?cited by 18
  11. 2026AI Agent Systems: Architectures, Applications, and Evaluationcited by 13
  12. 2025Fundamental Limitations in Pointwise Defences of LLM Finetuning APIscited by 10
2 more
  1. 2025LM Agents for Coordinating Multi-User Information Gatheringcited by 5
  2. 2026Utility-Guided Agent Orchestration for Efficient LLM Tool Usecited by 4

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

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  1. 2026Multi-User Large Language Model Agents
  2. 2026SafeHarness: Lifecycle-Integrated Security Architecture for LLM-based Agent Deployment
  3. 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
  4. 2024Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use
  5. 2026ActGov: Governing LLM Agent Actions via Policy-Constrained Validation
  6. 2026HarnessRisk: A Lifecycle-Oriented Benchmark for Agent Harness Safety
  7. 2026AgentLeak: A Benchmark for Internal-Channel Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
  8. 2026SecureClaw: Clawing Back Control of LLM Agents