mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Adversarial Feeds Steer LLM Agent Decisions Against Their Defaults

arXiv 2606.00914 ↗First posted 30 May 2026cs.AI cs.CL cs.CRcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Social simulation and multi-agent debate

Abstract (arXiv)

LLM agents increasingly decide from evidence assembled by upstream systems: retrievers choose documents, recommenders choose posts, and memory systems choose prior events. Existing evaluations usually hold this evidence fixed, missing failures in which individually ordinary items form a systematically one-sided context. We introduce a counterfactual evidence audit: expose an agent to two mirrored sets of five documents, measure the difference in six downstream decisions, and use that contrast to predict its response to disjoint 45-document contexts. The protocol was frozen before testing three held-out open-weight model families. Across 18 held-out model-task cells, five-document effects predict full-context effects with Spearman rho=.855 (p<.001), reduce mean absolute prediction error by 62% relative to a zero-effect predictor, and recover the direction of 12 of 13 material effects. A reviewer-requested post-hoc task-mean baseline is also substantially weaker (MAE .369 versus .167). Matched controls show that selecting one-sided ordinary items, rather than merely reordering identical items, causes the shift in a susceptible model. Across seven open-weight families, susceptibility transfers from an interactive feed to a static RAG dossier (rho=.750, exact p=.033), while a provenance warning does not reliably mitigate it. A separate study of three deployed Codex agent tiers finds strong audit-to-full ranking (rho=.951, p<.001) but no individually significant full-context effect after correction. Within this single synthetic remote-work domain, the result supports a domain-specific triage procedure, not a universal steering claim: evidence selection must be evaluated as part of the composed agent system.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Social simulation and multi-agent debate, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 11 of its 23 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 May 2026.

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11 of 23 references.

References · 11

  1. 2023Lost in the Middle: How Language Models Use Long Contextscited by 3,455
  2. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agentscited by 538
  3. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Basescited by 429
  4. 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defensescited by 364
  5. 2024PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Modelscited by 267
  6. 2025Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agentscited by 125
  7. 2025Control Illusion: The Failure of Instruction Hierarchies in Large Language Modelscited by 33
  8. 2024Ranking Manipulation for Conversational Search Enginescited by 26
  9. 2026Counterfactual Trace Auditing of LLM Agent Skillscited by 10
  10. 2025Evaluating the Effect of Retrieval Augmentation on Social Biasescited by 7
  11. 2026Rational Synthesizers or Heuristic Followers? Analyzing LLMs in RAG-based Question-Answeringcited by 5

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