Model Unlearning Objectives Vary for Distinct Language Functions
On the map: LLM safety and security → Machine unlearning
Abstract (arXiv)
Large language models (LLMs) learn undesirable properties during pretraining, including dangerous knowledge and toxic text generation. Just as post-training uses different objectives to shape different behaviors, we argue that unlearning methods should be designed for the language function at issue. To study this, we consider two mechanistically distinct unlearning goals, dangerous-knowledge unlearning and toxicity unlearning. For dangerous knowledge, we introduce a cosine-based, meta-learned variant of RMU. For toxicity, we propose a multi-layer objective based on layer-specific probe directions. Across four open-source 7-8B models, our methods achieve strong results, based on distinct training objectives for the two types of unlearning. Overall, our results suggest that unlearning should be studied as a family of problems, analogous to the multiple types of LLM post-training.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Machine unlearning, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 21 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 May 2026.
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21 of 30 references.
Closest ancestors · 4
Same direction, newest first
- 2024Do Unlearning Methods Remove Information from Language Model Weights?11 Oct
- 2024Split, Unlearn, Merge: Leveraging Data Attributes for More Effective Unlearning in LLMs17 Jun
- 2024Negative Preference Optimization: From Catastrophic Collapse to Effective Unlearning8 Apr
- 2024TOFU: A Task of Fictitious Unlearning for LLMs11 Jan
Other references · 17
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- 2022Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPTcited by 2,609
- 2023Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparencycited by 1,239
- 2020RealToxicityPrompts: Evaluating Neural Toxic Degeneration in Language Modelscited by 1,235
- 2019Machine Unlearningcited by 1,020
- 2023Dissecting Recall of Factual Associations in Auto-Regressive Language Modelscited by 512
- 2024The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearningcited by 488
- 2019Linguistic Knowledge and Transferability of Contextual Representationscited by 382
5 more
- 2024A Mechanistic Understanding of Alignment Algorithms: A Case Study on DPO and Toxicitycited by 179
- 2024Fantastic Semantics and Where to Find Them: Investigating Which Layers of Generative LLMs Reflect Lexical Semanticscited by 43
- 2025How Post-Training Reshapes LLMs: A Mechanistic View on Knowledge, Truthfulness, Refusal, and Confidencecited by 12
- 2019Robust Angular Local Descriptor Learningcited by 2
- 2025Something Just Like TRuST : Toxicity Recognition of Span and Targetcited by 2
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