A Constant-Time Implementation Methodology for Activation Functions on Microcontrollers
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Abstract (arXiv)
Embedded neural-network inference can leak information through timing side channels, including leakage caused by the evaluation of activation functions. This work proposes a constant-time implementation methodology for activation functions on embedded microcontrollers and validates it on ReLU, sigmoid, tanh, GELU, and Swish on an ARM Cortex-M4 platform. The proposed methodology combines branchless selection, fixed-cost Pad'e-based approximation, dummy arithmetic where needed, and cycle alignment to obtain timing-regular activation-function implementations. As motivation, we also evaluate a desynchronization-based countermeasure and show that it remains vulnerable to a template-based timing attack. Experimental results show that the resulting protected implementations achieve identical cycle counts for all tested inputs, including (88) cycles in the three-function setting and (108) cycles in the five-function setting. At the same time, the numerical-error analysis indicates that the approximated nonlinear functions retain high accuracy. These results suggest that the proposed methodology provides a practical basis for constructing side-channel-resistant activation functions in embedded inference.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 7 of its 29 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 21 May 2026.
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References · 7
- 2016Gaussian Error Linear Units (GELUs)cited by 3,502
- 2019Hardware/Software Co-Exploration of Neural Architecturescited by 50
- 2021Leaky Nets: Recovering Embedded Neural Network Models and Inputs through Simple Power and Timing Side-Channels -- Attacks and Defensescited by 11
- 2023A Desynchronization-Based Countermeasure Against Side-Channel Analysis of Neural Networkscited by 5
- 2025Make Shuffling Great Again: A Side-Channel Resistant Fisher-Yates Algorithm for Protecting Neural Networkscited by 3
- 2023Defense against ML-based Power Side-channel Attacks on DNN Accelerators with Adversarial Attackscited by 1
- 2025PermuteV: A Performant Side-channel-Resistant RISC-V Core Securing Edge AI Inferencecited by 1
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