Trusted Weights, Treacherous Optimizations? Optimization-Triggered Backdoor Attacks on LLMs

Inference optimization aims to minimize the latency and resource consumption of LLM inference while preserving output quality, making large-scale deployment practical and cost-effective. However, optimized execution can introduce small numerical inconsistencies from the original model. We reveal that this inconsistency not only causes the model's outputs to diverge, but more critically can introduce hidden backdoors. The backdoor remains dormant under standard unoptimized execution and is activated only when inference optimization is enabled, allowing it to evade existing backdoor detection pipelines. We first introduce the Input-Specific Optimization Backdoor (ISOB) to demonstrate that optimization-induced differences can cause wrong predictions. However, ISOB remains input-specific and cannot establish a universal optimization-triggered backdoor. To overcome this limitation, we design the Universal Optimization Backdoor (UOB). The backdoored model stays benign under unoptimized execution but activates when inference optimization is enabled. We conduct extensive experiments across seven mainstream open-source LLMs, four tasks, and three optimization backends. UOB reaches up to 100% attack success while largely preserving clean accuracy. To mitigate this vulnerability, we design three defense methods that reduce the backdoor ASR to at most 0.02 while preserving clean accuracy. These results reveal inference optimization as a new LLM security attack surface and motivate defenses against test-deployment disagreement.