mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

ADR: An Agentic Detection System for Enterprise Agentic AI Security

arXiv 2605.17380 ↗First posted 17 May 2026cs.AI cs.CR cs.LGcited by 2

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)

We present the Agentic AI Detection and Response (ADR) system, the first large-scale, production-proven enterprise framework for securing AI agents operating through the Model Context Protocol (MCP). We identify three persistent challenges in this domain: (1) limited observability -- existing Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools see file writes but not the agent reasoning, prompts, or causal chains linking intent to execution; (2) insufficient robustness -- static defenses constrained by pre-defined rules fail to generalize across diverse attack techniques and enterprise contexts; and (3) high detection costs -- LLM-based inference is prohibitively expensive at scale. ADR addresses these challenges via three components: the ADR Sensor for high-fidelity agentic telemetry, the ADR Explorer for systematic pre-deployment red teaming and hard-example generation, and the ADR Detector for scalable, two-tier online detection combining fast triage with context-aware reasoning. Deployed at Uber for over ten months, ADR has sustained reliable detection in production with growing adoption reaching over 7,200 unique hosts and processing over 10,000 agent sessions daily, uncovering hundreds of credential exposures across 26 categories and enabling a shift-left prevention layer (97.2% precision, 206 detected credentials). To validate the approach and enable community adoption, we introduce ADR-Bench (302 tasks, 17 techniques, 133 MCP servers), where ADR achieves zero false positives while detecting 67% of attacks -- outperforming three state-of-the-art baselines (ALRPHFS, GuardAgent, LlamaFirewall) by 2--4x in F1-score. On AgentDojo (public prompt injection benchmark), ADR detects all attacks with only three false alarms out of 93 tasks.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 24 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 May 2026.

Builds on

24 of 40 references.

Closest ancestors · 13

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025RAS-Eval: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Security Evaluation of LLM Agents in Real-World Environments18 Jun
  2. 2025ALRPHFS: Adversarially Learned Risk Patterns with Hierarchical Fast & Slow Reasoning for Robust Agent Defense25 May
  3. 2025LlamaFirewall: An open source guardrail system for building secure AI agents6 May
  4. 2025MCP Guardian: A Security-First Layer for Safeguarding MCP-Based AI System17 Apr
  5. 2025MCP Safety Audit: LLMs with the Model Context Protocol Allow Major Security Exploits2 Apr
  6. 2025ShieldAgent: Shielding Agents via Verifiable Safety Policy Reasoning26 Mar
  7. 2025AGrail: A Lifelong Agent Guardrail with Effective and Adaptive Safety Detection17 Feb
  8. 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents19 Dec
  9. 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
  10. 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
  11. 2024RedAgent: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Context-aware Autonomous Language Agent23 Jul
  12. 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training10 Jan
1 more
  1. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 11

  1. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
  2. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 3,050
  3. 2023Jailbreaking ChatGPT via Prompt Engineering: An Empirical Studycited by 498
  4. 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 365
  5. 2024AutoDAN-Turbo: A Lifelong Agent for Strategy Self-Exploration to Jailbreak LLMscited by 199
  6. 2023Open Sesame! Universal Black Box Jailbreaking of Large Language Modelscited by 134
  7. 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 121
  8. 2024ALI-Agent: Assessing LLMs' Alignment with Human Values via Agent-based Evaluationcited by 47
  9. 2024When LLM Meets DRL: Advancing Jailbreaking Efficiency via DRL-guided Searchcited by 47
  10. 2025AutoRedTeamer: Autonomous Red Teaming with Lifelong Attack Integrationcited by 43
  11. 2025Simplified and Secure MCP Gateways for Enterprise AI Integrationcited by 4

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Attack Success Rate Is Not a Number: On Measurement Validity in Agentic AI Security Evaluation
  2. 2026Securing the AI Agent: A Unified Framework for Multi-Layer Agent Red Teaming
  3. 2026Towards Optimal Agentic Architectures for Offensive Security Tasks
  4. 2026AgentWard: A Lifecycle Security Architecture for Autonomous AI Agents
  5. 2026Autonomous Incident Resolution at Hyperscale: An Agentic AI Architecture for Network Operations
  6. 2026REDAgentBench: Executable Red Teaming and Faithful Measurement of LLM Agent Systems
  7. 2025Agentic AI Security: Threats, Defenses, Evaluation, and Open Challenges
  8. 2026A2ABreak: Systematic Security Analysis of the A2A Protocol ↗