A Mimetic Detector for Adversarial Image Perturbations
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Abstract (arXiv)
Adversarial attacks fool deep image classifiers by adding tiny, almost invisible noise patterns to a clean image. The standard ℓ^∞-bounded attacks (FGSM and PGD) produce high-frequency, near-random sign patterns at the pixel level: small in ℓ2, but carrying disproportionate gradient energy. We exploit this with a single-shot, training-free detector using the high-order Corbino-Castillo mimetic operators from the open-source MOLE library. No retraining, no surrogate classifier, no access to the network under attack: the verdict is a property of the input alone, computed in O(HW) time. We illustrate the detector on the standard "peppers" test image: untargeted FGSM and PGD attacks at the ℓ^∞ budget varepsilon = 16/255 flip SqueezeNet's prediction from "bell pepper" to "doormat" (FGSM) and "maraca" (PGD), and the detector separates these adversarial inputs from the clean image by 4.1×-5.0× (FGSM) and 1.9×-2.2× (PGD). The margin grows monotonically with the operator order k, while an equal-amplitude smooth perturbation leaves the statistic within 1% of its clean value.
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References · 5
- 2014Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examplescited by 7,364
- 2017Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attackscited by 6,415
- 2016Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networkscited by 2,998
- 2016SqueezeNet: AlexNet-level accuracy with 50x fewer parameters and <0.5MB model sizecited by 1,060
- 2021SpectralDefense: Detecting Adversarial Attacks on CNNs in the Fourier Domaincited by 30
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