mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Toward a Principled Framework for Agent Safety Measurement

arXiv 2605.01644 ↗First posted 2 May 2026cs.CRcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

LLM agents emit actions, not just text, and once taken, those actions often cannot be undone. Yet today's agent-safety evaluations run greedy or a few sampled rollouts and report a single safe/unsafe rate -- blind to the long-tail trajectories where unsafe behavior may arise from low-probability but non-negligible actions. We argue agent safety should be measured by search, not sampling. We apply BOA, a framework that, given a deployment configuration (model, decoder, prompt, environment, judger, likelihood budget), searches the in-budget trajectory space and reports a safety score: the probability the agent stays safe under the configuration. BOA searches both within a single LLM round and across the agent-environment interaction tree under a given likelihood budget, and makes search practical via batched decoding/judging, prefix caching, and chunked tree expansion. On agent-safety workloads, BOA discovers unsafe trajectories that greedy and sampled evaluations miss. BOA can additionally be used for ranking models, defenses, and attacks, all on the same scale, with manageable GPU costs.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 15 of its 22 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 May 2026.

Builds on

15 of 22 references.

Closest ancestors · 4

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
  2. 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
  3. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
  4. 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents18 Jan

Other references · 11

  1. 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,192
  2. 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,195
  3. 2019The Curious Case of Neural Text Degenerationcited by 2,881
  4. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  5. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 441
  6. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 233
  7. 2025Constitutional Classifiers: Defending against Universal Jailbreaks across Thousands of Hours of Red Teamingcited by 172
  8. 2024A Thorough Examination of Decoding Methods in the Era of LLMscited by 112
  9. 2024ToolSword: Unveiling Safety Issues of Large Language Models in Tool Learning Across Three Stagescited by 77
  10. 2025BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agentscited by 23
  11. 2025Toward Principled LLM Safety Testing: Solving the Jailbreak Oracle Problemcited by 4

Built on by

Not cited yet.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026ATBench: A Diverse and Realistic Agent Trajectory Benchmark for Safety Evaluation and Diagnosis
  2. 2026Taxonomy and Consistency Analysis of Safety Benchmarks for AI Agents
  3. 2026Agent Safety From Within: Detecting Harmful Trajectories from LLM Internal States
  4. 2025OpenAgentSafety: A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety
  5. 2025How Brittle is Agent Safety? Rethinking Agent Risk under Intent Concealment and Task Complexity
  6. 2026Towards a Unified Misuse Monitoring Benchmark
  7. 2026REDAgentBench: Executable Red Teaming and Faithful Measurement of LLM Agent Systems
  8. 2026AgentHazard: A Benchmark for Evaluating Harmful Behavior in Computer-Use Agents