mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

AI Alignment via Incentives and Correction

arXiv 2605.01643 ↗First posted 2 May 2026cs.LG cs.AIcited by 1

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Abstract (arXiv)

We study AI alignment through the lens of law-and-economics models of deterrence and enforcement. In these models, misconduct is not treated as an external failure, but as a strategic response to incentives: an actor weighs the gain from violation against the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. We argue that the same logic arises naturally in agentic AI pipelines. A solver may benefit from producing a persuasive but incorrect answer, hiding uncertainty, or exploiting spurious shortcuts, while an auditor or verifier must decide whether costly monitoring is worthwhile. Alignment is therefore a fixed-point problem: stronger penalties may deter solver misbehavior, but they can also reduce the auditor's incentive to inspect, since auditing then mainly incurs cost on a population that appears increasingly aligned. This perspective also changes what should count as a post-training signal. Standard feedback often attaches reward to the final answer alone, but a solver-auditor pipeline exposes the full correction event: whether the solver erred, whether the auditor inspected, whether the error was caught, and whether oversight incentives remained active. We formalize this interaction in a two-agent model in which a principal chooses rewards over joint correction outcomes, inducing both solver behavior and auditor monitoring. Reward design is therefore a bilevel optimization problem: rewards are judged not by their immediate semantic meaning, but by the behavioral equilibrium they induce. We propose a bandit-based outer-loop procedure for searching over reward profiles using noisy interaction feedback. Experiments on an LLM coding pipeline show that adaptive reward profiles can maintain useful oversight pressure and improve principal-aligned outcomes relative to static hand-designed rewards, including a substantial reduction in hallucinated incorrect attempts.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 24 of its 52 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 May 2026.

Builds on

24 of 52 references.

References · 24

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,712
  2. 2021Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problemscited by 9,743
  3. 2017Deep reinforcement learning from human preferencescited by 3,846
  4. 2023Let's Verify Step by Stepcited by 3,598
  5. 2021Program Synthesis with Large Language Modelscited by 3,509
  6. 2023Improving Factuality and Reasoning in Language Models through Multiagent Debatecited by 1,739
  7. 2016Concrete Problems in AI Safetycited by 1,582
  8. 2023Is Your Code Generated by ChatGPT Really Correct? Rigorous Evaluation of Large Language Models for Code Generationcited by 1,332
  9. 2021Measuring Coding Challenge Competence With APPScited by 879
  10. 2023Weak-to-Strong Generalization: Eliciting Strong Capabilities With Weak Supervisioncited by 445
  11. 2018Scalable agent alignment via reward modeling: a research directioncited by 438
  12. 2018AI safety via debatecited by 384
12 more
  1. 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 338
  2. 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversioncited by 207
  3. 2018Supervising strong learners by amplifying weak expertscited by 139
  4. 2024LLM Critics Help Catch LLM Bugscited by 138
  5. 2021Goal Misgeneralization in Deep Reinforcement Learningcited by 122
  6. 2019Reward Tampering Problems and Solutions in Reinforcement Learning: A Causal Influence Diagram Perspectivecited by 107
  7. 2018Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignmentcited by 60
  8. 2020Learning to Incentivize Other Learning Agentscited by 55
  9. 2025Beyond Verifiable Rewards: Scaling Reinforcement Learning for Language Models to Unverifiable Datacited by 29
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  12. 2026Escaping the Cognitive Well: Efficient Competition Math with Off-the-Shelf Modelscited by 8

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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

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  1. 2026Why Do AI Agents Break Rules? How Framing, Context, and Social Signals Shape Compliance
  2. 2026Alignment as Institutional Design: From Behavioral Correction to Transaction Structure in Intelligent Systems
  3. 2023Of Models and Tin Men: A Behavioural Economics Study of Principal-Agent Problems in AI Alignment using Large-Language Models
  4. 2025The Law-Following AI Framework: Legal Foundations and Technical Constraints. Legal Analogues for AI Actorship and technical feasibility of Law Alignment
  5. 2026Institutional AI: A Governance Framework for Distributional AGI Safety
  6. 2026Gram: Assessing sabotage propensities via automated alignment auditing
  7. 2026Norm Enforcement for AI Agents: Robustly Shaping Behavior in Multi-Agent Systems
  8. 2026Reward Hacking as Equilibrium under Finite Evaluation