mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Membership Inference Attacks Against Video Large Language Models

arXiv 2604.27002 ↗First posted 29 Apr 2026cs.CRcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Membership inference attacks

Abstract (arXiv)

Video large language models (VideoLLMs) are increasingly trained or instruction-tuned on large-scale video--text corpora collected from heterogeneous sources, raising an immediate privacy question: can an external auditor determine whether a particular video was used during training? While membership inference attacks (MIAs) have been studied extensively for classifiers and, more recently, for text and image generation models, the VideoLLM setting remains unexplored. This setting is challenging because black-box auditors observe only generated text, whereas the membership signal is entangled with video-specific factors such as motion complexity and temporal span. In this paper, we present a black-box MIA targeting VideoLLMs that couples temperature-perturbed generation with video-aware difficulty features. Our key intuition is that member samples tend to induce sharper, more brittle generation behavior across decoding temperatures, and that this signal should be interpreted jointly with the intrinsic difficulty of the queried video. Concretely, we query the target model at low and high temperatures, measure the semantic drift between the resulting texts. We evaluate the attack against textttLLaVA-Video-7B-Qwen2-Video-Only and achieve a member inference AUC of 0.68 and accuracy of 0.63. These results demonstrate that Video-LLMs are vulnerable to black-box membership inference attacks, highlighting an urgent need for the community to systematically evaluate and mitigate privacy risks in VideoLLMs.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Membership inference attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. First posted on arXiv 29 Apr 2026.

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