mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Preserving Decision Sovereignty in Military AI: A Trade-Secret-Safe Architectural Framework for Model Replaceability, Human Authority, and State Control

arXiv 2604.20867 ↗First posted 26 Mar 2026cs.CY cs.AI cs.CRcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Recent events surrounding the relationship between frontier AI suppliers and national-security customers have made a structural problem newly visible: once a privately governed model becomes embedded in military workflows, the supplier can influence not only technical performance but also the operational boundary conditions under which the system may be used. This paper argues that the central strategic issue is not merely access to capable models, but preservation of decision sovereignty: the state's ability to retain authority over decision policy, version control, fallback behavior, auditability, and final action approval even when analytical modules are sourced from commercial vendors. Using the public Anthropic--Pentagon dispute of 2026, the broader history of Project Maven, and recent U.S., NATO, U.K., and intelligence-community guidance as a motivating context, the paper develops a trade-secret-safe architectural formulation of the Energetic Paradigm as a layered, model-agnostic command-support design. In this formulation, supplier models remain replaceable analytical components, while routing, constraints, logging, escalation, and action authorization remain state-owned functions. The paper contributes three things: a definition of decision sovereignty for military AI; a threat model for supplier-induced boundary control; and a public architectural specification showing how model replaceability, human authority, and sovereign orchestration can reduce strategic dependency without requiring disclosure of proprietary implementation details. The argument is conceptual rather than experimental, but it yields concrete implications for procurement, governance, and alliance interoperability.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 6 of its 52 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 Mar 2026.

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6 of 52 references.

References · 6

  1. 2021On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Modelscited by 3,961
  2. 2016Concrete Problems in AI Safetycited by 1,582
  3. 2021Ethical and social risks of harm from Language Modelscited by 957
  4. 2020Closing the AI Accountability Gap: Defining an End-to-End Framework for Internal Algorithmic Auditingcited by 380
  5. 2018The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigationcited by 159
  6. 2016Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligencecited by 74

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