Involuntary In-Context Learning: Exploiting Few-Shot Pattern Completion to Bypass Safety Alignment in GPT-5.4
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks
also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)
Safety alignment in large language models relies on behavioral training that can be overridden when sufficiently strong in-context patterns compete with learned refusal behaviors. We introduce Involuntary In-Context Learning (IICL), an attack class that uses abstract operator framing with few-shot examples to force pattern completion that overrides safety training. Through 3479 probes across 10 OpenAI models, we identify the attack's effective components through a seven-experiment ablation study. Key findings: (1)~semantic operator naming achieves 100% bypass rate (50/50, p < 0.001); (2)~the attack requires abstract framing, since identical examples in direct question-and-answer format yield 0%; (3)~example ordering matters strongly (interleaved: 76%, harmful-first: 6%); (4)~temperature has no meaningful effect (46-56% across 0.0--1.0). On the HarmBench benchmark, IICL achieves 24.0% bypass [18.6%, 30.4%] against GPT-5.4 with detailed 619-word responses, compared to 0.0% for direct queries.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 16 of its 21 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 21 Apr 2026.
Builds on
16 of 21 references.
Closest ancestors · 3
Same direction, newest first
- 2023Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models with Only Few In-Context Demonstrations10 Oct
- 2023GPT-4 Is Too Smart To Be Safe: Stealthy Chat with LLMs via Cipher12 Aug
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul
Other references · 13
- 2020Language Models are Few-Shot Learnerscited by 32,199
- 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,712
- 2023Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Modelcited by 7,916
- 2022Rethinking the Role of Demonstrations: What Makes In-Context Learning Work?cited by 1,413
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,326
- 2023"Do Anything Now": Characterizing and Evaluating In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts on Large Language Modelscited by 457
- 2023DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreakercited by 337
- 2024ArtPrompt: ASCII Art-based Jailbreak Attacks against Aligned LLMscited by 197
- 2024CodeAttack: Revealing Safety Generalization Challenges of Large Language Models via Code Completioncited by 70
- 2024The Dark Side of Function Calling: Pathways to Jailbreaking Large Language Modelscited by 20
- 2024SequentialBreak: Large Language Models Can be Fooled by Embedding Jailbreak Prompts into Sequential Prompt Chainscited by 16
1 more
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.
2 papers.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Towards Context-Invariant Safety Alignment for Large Language Models
- 2026Beyond Refusal Patterns: Safe-Role Internalization for Robust and Generalizable LLM Safety Alignment
- 2026DeShortcut-Align: Decoupling Spurious Shortcuts for Robust Safety Alignment in Large Reasoning Models
- 2025Rethinking Deep Alignment Through The Lens Of Incomplete Learning
- 2026Safety in Batches? Understanding and Mitigating Safety Failures in Batch Prompting
- 2025Context-Aware Hierarchical Learning: A Two-Step Paradigm towards Safer LLMs
- 2026Continual Safety Alignment via Gradient-Based Sample Selection
- 2026Breaking Safety at the Token Boundary: How BPE Tokenization Creates Exploitable Gaps in LLM Alignment