mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Into the Gray Zone: Domain Contexts Can Blur LLM Safety Boundaries

arXiv 2604.15717 ↗First posted 17 Apr 2026cs.CRcited by 1

On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks

also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)

A central goal of LLM alignment is to balance helpfulness with harmlessness, yet these objectives conflict when the same knowledge serves both legitimate and malicious purposes. This tension is amplified by context-sensitive alignment: we observe that domain-specific contexts (e.g., chemistry) selectively relax defenses for domain-relevant harmful knowledge, while safety-research contexts (e.g., jailbreak studies) trigger broader relaxation spanning all harm categories. To systematically exploit this vulnerability, we propose Jargon, a framework combining safety-research contexts with multi-turn adversarial interactions that achieves attack success rates exceeding 93% across seven frontier models, including GPT-5.2, Claude-4.5, and Gemini-3, substantially outperforming existing methods. Activation space analysis reveals that Jargon queries occupy an intermediate region between benign and harmful inputs, a gray zone where refusal decisions become unreliable. To mitigate this vulnerability, we design a policy-guided safeguard that steers models toward helpful yet harmless responses, and internalize this capability through alignment fine-tuning, reducing attack success rates while preserving helpfulness.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 22 of its 43 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Apr 2026.

Builds on

22 of 43 references.

Closest ancestors · 3

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!5 Oct
  2. 2023Defending Against Alignment-Breaking Attacks via Robustly Aligned LLM18 Sep
  3. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul

Other references · 19

  1. 2021LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Modelscited by 14,380
  2. 2021Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problemscited by 10,109
  3. 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
  4. 2020Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understandingcited by 7,963
  5. 2019HellaSwag: Can a Machine Really Finish Your Sentence?cited by 4,100
  6. 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,420
  7. 2024Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attackcited by 390
  8. 2024AmpleGCG: Learning a Universal and Transferable Generative Model of Adversarial Suffixes for Jailbreaking Both Open and Closed LLMscited by 172
  9. 2024LLM Defenses Are Not Robust to Multi-Turn Human Jailbreaks Yetcited by 151
  10. 2024AutoDefense: Multi-Agent LLM Defense against Jailbreak Attackscited by 145
  11. 2025X-Teaming: Multi-Turn Jailbreaks and Defenses with Adaptive Multi-Agentscited by 125
  12. 2024Do Unlearning Methods Remove Information from Language Model Weights?cited by 73
7 more
  1. 2022CodeAttack: Code-Based Adversarial Attacks for Pre-trained Programming Language Modelscited by 53
  2. 2024MRJ-Agent: An Effective Jailbreak Agent for Multi-Round Dialoguecited by 33
  3. 2025Multi-Turn Jailbreaks Are Simpler Than They Seemcited by 17
  4. 2025Advancing LLM Safe Alignment with Safety Representation Rankingcited by 16
  5. 2025Personalized Safety in LLMs: A Benchmark and A Planning-Based Agent Approachcited by 16
  6. 2025GSPR: Aligning LLM Safeguards as Generalizable Safety Policy Reasonerscited by 13
  7. 2025Anyone Can Jailbreak: Prompt-Based Attacks on LLMs and T2Iscited by 7

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Safety Is Not Universal: The Selective Safety Trap in LLM Alignment
  2. 2026Safety Paradox: How Enhanced Safety Awareness Leaves LLMs Vulnerable to Posterior Attack
  3. 2026Few Tokens, Big Leverage: Preserving Safety Alignment by Constraining Safety Tokens during Fine-tuning
  4. 2024Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deep
  5. 2026Understanding the Effects of Safety Unalignment on Large Language Models
  6. 2025Safety Alignment Can Be Not Superficial With Explicit Safety Signals
  7. 2025The Hidden Dimensions of LLM Alignment: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Orthogonal Safety Directions
  8. 2025Bleeding Pathways: Vanishing Discriminability in LLM Hidden States Fuels Jailbreak Attacks