Robust Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Small UAS Separation Assurance under GPS Degradation and Spoofing

We address robust separation assurance for small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) under GPS degradation and spoofing via Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). In cooperative surveillance, each aircraft (or agent) broadcasts its GPS-derived position; when such position broadcasts are corrupted, the entire observed air traffic state becomes unreliable. We cast this state observation corruption as a zero-sum game between the agents and an adversary: with probability R, the adversary perturbs the observed state to maximally degrade each agent's safety performance. We derive a closed-form expression for this adversarial perturbation, bypassing the iterative inner optimization of adversarial training entirely and enabling linear-time evaluation in the state dimension. We show that this expression approximates the exact minimizer of the value function over the modeled uncertainty set with second-order accuracy. We further bound the safety performance gap between clean and corrupted observations, showing that it degrades at most linearly with the corruption probability under Kullback-Leibler regularization. Finally, we integrate the closed-form adversarial policy into a MARL policy gradient algorithm to obtain a robust counter-policy for the agents. In a high-density sUAS simulation, we observe near-zero collision rates under corruption levels up to 35%, outperforming a baseline policy trained without adversarial perturbations.