Session Risk Memory (SRM): Temporal Authorization for Deterministic Pre-Execution Safety Gates
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Abstract (arXiv)
Deterministic pre-execution safety gates evaluate whether individual agent actions are compatible with their assigned roles. While effective at per-action authorization, these systems are structurally blind to distributed attacks that decompose harmful intent across multiple individually-compliant steps. This paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight deterministic module that extends stateless execution gates with trajectory-level authorization. SRM maintains a compact semantic centroid representing the evolving behavioral profile of an agent session and accumulates a risk signal through exponential moving average over baseline-subtracted gate outputs. It operates on the same semantic vector representation as the underlying gate, requiring no additional model components, training, or probabilistic inference. We evaluate SRM on a multi-turn benchmark of 80 sessions containing slow-burn exfiltration, gradual privilege escalation, and compliance drift scenarios. Results show that ILION+SRM achieves F1 = 1.0000 with 0% false positive rate, compared to stateless ILION at F1 = 0.9756 with 5% FPR, while maintaining 100% detection rate for both systems. Critically, SRM eliminates all false positives with a per-turn overhead under 250 microseconds. The framework introduces a conceptual distinction between spatial authorization consistency (evaluated per action) and temporal authorization consistency (evaluated over trajectory), providing a principled basis for session-level safety in agentic systems.
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