mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

An Agentic Multi-Agent Architecture for Cybersecurity Risk Management

arXiv 2603.20131 ↗First posted 20 Mar 2026eess.SY cs.AI cs.CRcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Getting a real cybersecurity risk assessment for a small organization is expensive -- a NIST CSF-aligned engagement runs 15,000 on the low end, takes weeks, and depends on practitioners who are genuinely scarce. Most small companies skip it entirely. We built a six-agent AI system where each agent handles one analytical stage: profiling the organization, mapping assets, analyzing threats, evaluating controls, scoring risks, and generating recommendations. Agents share a persistent context that grows as the assessment proceeds, so later agents build on what earlier ones concluded -- the mechanism that distinguishes this from standard sequential agent pipelines. We tested it on a 15-person HIPAA-covered healthcare company and compared outputs to independent assessments by three CISSP practitioners -- the system agreed with them 85% of the time on severity classifications, covered 92% of identified risks, and finished in under 15 minutes. We then ran 30 repeated single-agent assessments across five synthetic but sector-realistic organizational profiles in healthcare, fintech, manufacturing, retail, and SaaS, comparing a general-purpose Mistral-7B against a domain fine-tuned model. Both completed every run. The fine-tuned model flagged threats the baseline could not see at all: PHI exposure in healthcare, OT/IIoT vulnerabilities in manufacturing, platform-specific risks in retail. The full multi-agent pipeline, however, failed every one of 30 attempts on a Tesla T4 with its 4,096-token default context window -- context capacity, not model quality, turned out to be the binding constraint.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 3 of its 19 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 20 Mar 2026.

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3 of 19 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Hack Websites6 Feb

Other references · 2

  1. 2020Language Models are Few-Shot Learnerscited by 32,199
  2. 2023The Rise and Potential of Large Language Model Based Agents: A Surveycited by 1,422

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