LAAF: Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework A Systematic Red-Teaming Methodology for LPCI Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Model Systems
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)
Agentic LLM systems equipped with persistent memory, RAG pipelines, and external tool connectors face a class of attacks - Logic-layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI) - for which no automated red-teaming instrument existed. We present LAAF (Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework), the first automated red-teaming framework to combine an LPCI-specific technique taxonomy with stage-sequential seed escalation - two capabilities absent from existing tools: Garak lacks memory-persistence and cross-session triggering; PyRIT supports multi-turn testing but treats turns independently, without seeding each stage from the prior breakthrough. LAAF provides: (i) a 49-technique taxonomy spanning six attack categories (Encoding~11, Structural~8, Semantic~8, Layered~5, Trigger~12, Exfiltration~5; see Table 1), combinable across 5 variants per technique and 6 lifecycle stages, yielding a theoretical maximum of 2,822,400 unique payloads (49 × 5 × 1,920 × 6; SHA-256 deduplicated at generation time); and (ii) a Persistent Stage Breaker (PSB) that drives payload mutation stage-by-stage: on each breakthrough, the PSB seeds the next stage with a mutated form of the winning payload, mirroring real adversarial escalation. Evaluation on five production LLM platforms across three independent runs demonstrates that LAAF achieves higher stage-breakthrough efficiency than single-technique random testing, with a mean aggregate breakthrough rate of 84% (range 83--86%) and platform-level rates stable within 17 percentage points across runs. Layered combinations and semantic reframing are the highest-effectiveness technique categories, with layered payloads outperforming encoding on well-defended platforms.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 13 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 9 of its 21 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 18 Mar 2026.
Builds on
9 of 21 references.
Closest ancestors · 2
Same direction, newest first
- 2025Logic layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI): A Novel Security Vulnerability Class in Agentic Systems14 Jul
- 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
Other references · 7
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,064
- 2020Extracting Training Data from Large Language Modelscited by 2,181
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,417
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,404
- 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 817
- 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 477
- 2024garak: A Framework for Security Probing Large Language Modelscited by 48
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Autonomous Adversary: Red-Teaming in the age of LLM
- 2026AutoRISE: Agent-Driven Strategy Evolution for Red-Teaming Large Language Models
- 2026PI-Hunter: Automated Red-Teaming for Exposing and Localizing Prompt Injections
- 2025Building Safe GenAI Applications: An End-to-End Overview of Red Teaming for Large Language Models
- 2024Operationalizing a Threat Model for Red-Teaming Large Language Models (LLMs)
- 2026REDAgentBench: Executable Red Teaming and Faithful Measurement of LLM Agent Systems
- 2025CoP: Agentic Red-teaming for Large Language Models using Composition of Principles
- 2025AgentVigil: Generic Black-Box Red-teaming for Indirect Prompt Injection against LLM Agents