Human-Certified Module Repositories for the AI Age
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Abstract (arXiv)
Human-Certified Module Repositories (HCMRs) are introduced in this work as a new architectural model for constructing trustworthy software in the era of AI-assisted development. As large language models increasingly participate in code generation, configuration synthesis, and multi-component integration, the reliability of AI-assembled systems will depend critically on the trustworthiness of the building blocks they use. Today's software supply-chain incidents and modular development ecosystems highlight the risks of relying on components with unclear provenance, insufficient review, or unpredictable composition behavior. We argue that future AI-driven development workflows require repositories of reusable modules that are curated, security-reviewed, provenance-rich, and equipped with explicit interface contracts. To this end, we propose HCMRs, a framework that blends human oversight with automated analysis to certify modules and support safe, predictable assembly by both humans and AI agents. We present a reference architecture for HCMRs, outline a certification and provenance workflow, analyze threat surfaces relevant to modular ecosystems, and extract lessons from recent failures. We further discuss implications for governance, scalability, and AI accountability, positioning HCMRs as a foundational substrate for reliable and auditable AI-constructed software systems.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 5 of its 45 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Mar 2026.
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5 of 45 references.
References · 5
- 2024How secure is AI-generated Code: A Large-Scale Comparison of Large Language Modelscited by 23
- 2025Is Vibe Coding Safe? Benchmarking Vulnerability of Agent-Generated Code in Real-World Taskscited by 18
- 2025Security Degradation in Iterative AI Code Generation -- A Systematic Analysis of the Paradoxcited by 10
- 2024On the critical path to implant backdoors and the effectiveness of potential mitigation techniques: Early learnings from XZcited by 3
- 2026A Longitudinal Measurement Study of Log4Shell Exploitation from a Reactive Network Telescopecited by 1
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