Manifold of Failure: Behavioral Attraction Basins in Language Models
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Abstract (arXiv)
While prior work has focused on projecting adversarial examples back onto the manifold of natural data to restore safety, we argue that a comprehensive understanding of AI safety requires characterizing the unsafe regions themselves. This paper introduces a framework for systematically mapping the Manifold of Failure in Large Language Models (LLMs). We reframe the search for vulnerabilities as a quality diversity problem, using MAP-Elites to illuminate the continuous topology of these failure regions, which we term behavioral attraction basins. Our quality metric, Alignment Deviation, guides the search towards areas where the model's behavior diverges most from its intended alignment. Across three LLMs: Llama-3-8B, GPT-OSS-20B, and GPT-5-Mini, we show that MAP-Elites achieves up to 63% behavioral coverage, discovers up to 370 distinct vulnerability niches, and reveals dramatically different model-specific topological signatures: Llama-3-8B exhibits a near-universal vulnerability plateau (mean Alignment Deviation 0.93), GPT-OSS-20B shows a fragmented landscape with spatially concentrated basins (mean 0.73), and GPT-5-Mini demonstrates strong robustness with a ceiling at 0.50. Our approach produces interpretable, global maps of each model's safety landscape that no existing attack method (GCG, PAIR, or TAP) can provide, shifting the paradigm from finding discrete failures to understanding their underlying structure.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 9 of its 17 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 Feb 2026.
Builds on
9 of 17 references.
References · 9
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,326
- 2020MPNet: Masked and Permuted Pre-training for Language Understandingcited by 973
- 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 619
- 2015Illuminating search spaces by mapping elitescited by 406
- 2024Rainbow Teaming: Open-Ended Generation of Diverse Adversarial Promptscited by 189
- 2025Constitutional Classifiers: Defending against Universal Jailbreaks across Thousands of Hours of Red Teamingcited by 172
- 2023Why do universal adversarial attacks work on large language models?: Geometry might be the answercited by 13
- 2024Finding a Needle in the Adversarial Haystack: A Targeted Paraphrasing Approach For Uncovering Edge Cases with Minimal Distribution Distortioncited by 3
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.