Correctness, Artificial Intelligence, and the Epistemic Value of Mathematical Proof
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
We argue that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a mathematical proof to have epistemic value that it be "correct", in the sense of formalizable in a formal proof system. We then present a view on the relationship between mathematics and logic that clarifies the role of formal correctness in mathematics. Finally, we discuss the significance of these arguments for recent discussions about automated theorem provers and applications of AI to mathematics.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 0 of its 48 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Feb 2026.
Builds on
0 of 48 references.
No references here yet.
Built on by
Not cited yet.