mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Protecting Context and Prompts: Deterministic Security for Non-Deterministic AI

arXiv 2602.10481 ↗First posted 11 Feb 2026cs.CR cs.AI cs.MAcited by 1

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Model (LLM) applications are vulnerable to prompt injection and context manipulation attacks that traditional security models cannot prevent. We introduce two novel primitives--authenticated prompts and authenticated context--that provide cryptographically verifiable provenance across LLM workflows. Authenticated prompts enable self-contained lineage verification, while authenticated context uses tamper-evident hash chains to ensure integrity of dynamic inputs. Building on these primitives, we formalize a policy algebra with four proven theorems providing protocol-level Byzantine resistance--even adversarial agents cannot violate organizational policies. Five complementary defenses--from lightweight resource controls to LLM-based semantic validation--deliver layered, preventative security with formal guarantees. Evaluation against representative attacks spanning 6 exhaustive categories achieves 100% detection with zero false positives and nominal overhead. We demonstrate the first approach combining cryptographically enforced prompt lineage, tamper-evident context, and provable policy reasoning--shifting LLM security from reactive detection to preventative guarantees.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 14 of its 33 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Feb 2026.

Builds on

14 of 33 references.

Closest ancestors · 6

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Lessons from Defending Gemini Against Indirect Prompt Injections20 May
  2. 2024Attention Tracker: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMs1 Nov
  3. 2024Prompt Infection: LLM-to-LLM Prompt Injection within Multi-Agent Systems9 Oct
  4. 2024SecAlign: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Preference Optimization7 Oct
  5. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection23 Feb
  6. 2022Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned23 Aug

Other references · 8

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,712
  2. 2017Deep reinforcement learning from human preferencescited by 3,846
  3. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 2,950
  4. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
  5. 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,565
  6. 2023CAMEL: Communicative Agents for "Mind" Exploration of Large Language Model Societycited by 1,348
  7. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
  8. 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 347

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2025Prompt Flow Integrity to Prevent Privilege Escalation in LLM Agents
  2. 2026ARGUS: Defending LLM Agents Against Context-Aware Prompt Injection
  3. 2026A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security
  4. 2025Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents against Prompt Injections
  5. 2026Prompt Control-Flow Integrity: A Priority-Aware Runtime Defense Against Prompt Injection in LLM Systems
  6. 2025Automating Prompt Leakage Attacks on Large Language Models Using Agentic Approach
  7. 2025DRIFT: Dynamic Rule-Based Defense with Injection Isolation for Securing LLM Agents
  8. 2025SIEVE: Selective Integrity Verification and Escalation for Defending LLM Agents against Indirect Prompt Injection