Assessing Domain-Level Susceptibility to Emergent Misalignment from Narrow Finetuning
On the map: LLM safety and security → Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails
Abstract (arXiv)
Emergent misalignment poses risks to AI safety as language models are increasingly used for autonomous tasks. In this paper, we present a population of large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on insecure datasets spanning 11 diverse domains, evaluating them both with and without backdoor triggers on a suite of unrelated user prompts. Our evaluation experiments on textttQwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct and textttGPT-4o-mini reveal two key findings: (i) backdoor triggers increase the rate of misalignment across 77.8% of domains (average drop: 4.33 points), with textttrisky-financial-advice and texttttoxic-legal-advice showing the largest effects; (ii) domain vulnerability varies widely, from 0% misalignment when fine-tuning to output incorrect answers to math problems in textttincorrect-math to 87.67% when fine-tuned on textttgore-movie-trivia. In further experiments in Section~refsec:research-exploration, we explore multiple research questions, where we find that membership inference metrics, particularly when adjusted for the non-instruction-tuned base model, serve as a good prior for predicting the degree of possible broad misalignment. Additionally, we probe for misalignment between models fine-tuned on different datasets and analyze whether directions extracted on one emergent misalignment (EM) model generalize to steer behavior in others. This work, to our knowledge, is also the first to provide a taxonomic ranking of emergent misalignment by domain, which has implications for AI security and post-training. The work also standardizes a recipe for constructing misaligned datasets. All code and datasets are publicly available on GitHub.footnotehttps://github.com/abhishek9909/assessing-domain-emergent-misalignment/tree/main
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 16 of its 46 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Jan 2026.
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16 of 46 references.
Closest ancestors · 2
Same direction, newest first
- 2025Thought Crime: Backdoors and Emergent Misalignment in Reasoning Models16 Jun
- 2025Benign Samples Matter! Fine-tuning On Outlier Benign Samples Severely Breaks Safety11 May
Other references · 14
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- 2023The Linear Representation Hypothesis and the Geometry of Large Language Modelscited by 679
- 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 478
- 2025Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threatscited by 136
- 2024LLM Dataset Inference: Did you train on my dataset?cited by 107
- 2025Model Organisms for Emergent Misalignmentcited by 84
- 2025Convergent Linear Representations of Emergent Misalignmentcited by 66
- 2023Cousins Of The Vendi Score: A Family Of Similarity-Based Diversity Metrics For Science And Machine Learningcited by 24
- 2024Exposing Privacy Gaps: Membership Inference Attack on Preference Data for LLM Alignmentcited by 24
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.
2 papers.