Activation-Space Anchored Access Control for Multi-Class Permission Reasoning in Large Language Models
On the map: LLM reasoning → Reasoning for agents, planning and code
Abstract (arXiv)
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed over knowledge bases for efficient knowledge retrieval and question answering. However, LLMs can inadvertently answer beyond a user's permission scope, leaking sensitive content, thus making it difficult to deploy knowledge-base QA under fine-grained access control requirements. In this work, we identify a geometric regularity in intermediate activations: for the same query, representations induced by different permission scopes cluster distinctly and are readily separable. Building on this separability, we propose Activation-space Anchored Access Control (AAAC), a training-free framework for multi-class permission control. AAAC constructs an anchor bank, with one permission anchor per class, from a small offline sample set and requires no fine-tuning. At inference time, a multi-anchor steering mechanism redirects each query's activations toward the anchor-defined authorized region associated with the current user, thereby suppressing over-privileged generations by design. Finally, extensive experiments across three LLM families demonstrate that AAAC reduces permission violation rates by up to 86.5% and prompt-based attack success rates by 90.7%, while improving response usability with minor inference overhead compared to baselines.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Reasoning for agents, planning and code, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning. Builds on 0 of its 25 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 20 Jan 2026.
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