Bridging the Gap Between Estimated and True Regret Towards Reliable Regret Estimation in Deep Learning based Mechanism Design
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Abstract (arXiv)
Recent advances, such as RegretNet, ALGnet, RegretFormer and CITransNet, use deep learning to approximate optimal multi item auctions by relaxing incentive compatibility (IC) and measuring its violation via ex post regret. However, the true accuracy of these regret estimates remains unclear. Computing exact regret is computationally intractable, and current models rely on gradient based optimizers whose outcomes depend heavily on hyperparameter choices. Through extensive experiments, we reveal that existing methods systematically underestimate actual regret (In some models, the true regret is several hundred times larger than the reported regret), leading to overstated claims of IC and revenue. To address this issue, we derive a lower bound on regret and introduce an efficient item wise regret approximation. Building on this, we propose a guided refinement procedure that substantially improves regret estimation accuracy while reducing computational cost. Our method provides a more reliable foundation for evaluating incentive compatibility in deep learning based auction mechanisms and highlights the need to reassess prior performance claims in this area.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 13 of its 24 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 20 Jan 2026.
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13 of 24 references.
References · 13
- 2018Automated Mechanism Design via Neural Networkscited by 31
- 2020A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Designcited by 31
- 2021Neural Auction: End-to-End Learning of Auction Mechanisms for E-Commerce Advertisingcited by 31
- 2020Auction learning as a two-player gamecited by 29
- 2022Optimal-er Auctions through Attentioncited by 26
- 2021PreferenceNet: Encoding Human Preferences in Auction Design with Deep Learningcited by 22
- 2022Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctionscited by 21
- 2020ProportionNet: Balancing Fairness and Revenue for Auction Design with Deep Learningcited by 19
- 2022A Context-Integrated Transformer-Based Neural Network for Auction Designcited by 19
- 2024GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learningcited by 14
- 2014A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyercited by 9
- 2016Simple Mechanisms for Subadditive Buyers via Dualitycited by 6
1 more
- 2013Optimal mechanisms with simple menuscited by 1
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