Toward Trustworthy Agentic AI: A Multimodal Framework for Preventing Prompt Injection Attacks
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
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Abstract (arXiv)
Powerful autonomous systems, which reason, plan, and converse using and between numerous tools and agents, are made possible by Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Models (VLMs), and new agentic AI systems, like LangChain and GraphChain. Nevertheless, this agentic environment increases the probability of the occurrence of multimodal prompt injection (PI) attacks, in which concealed or malicious instructions carried in text, pictures, metadata, or agent-to-agent messages may spread throughout the graph and lead to unintended behavior, a breach of policy, or corruption of state. In order to mitigate these risks, this paper suggests a Cross-Agent Multimodal Provenanc- Aware Defense Framework whereby all the prompts, either user-generated or produced by upstream agents, are sanitized and all the outputs generated by an LLM are verified independently before being sent to downstream nodes. This framework contains a Text sanitizer agent, visual sanitizer agent, and output validator agent all coordinated by a provenance ledger, which keeps metadata of modality, source, and trust level throughout the entire agent network. This architecture makes sure that agent-to-agent communication abides by clear trust frames such such that injected instructions are not propagated down LangChain or GraphChain-style-workflows. The experimental assessments show that multimodal injection detection accuracy is significantly enhanced, and the cross-agent trust leakage is minimized, as well as, agentic execution pathways become stable. The framework, which expands the concept of provenance tracking and validation to the multi-agent orchestration, enhances the establishment of secure, understandable and reliable agentic AI systems.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 5 of its 15 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Dec 2025.
Builds on
5 of 15 references.
References · 5
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 8.
8 papers.
- 2026SOK: A Taxonomy of Attack Vectors and Defense Strategies for Agentic Supply Chain Runtimecited by 8
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 7
- 2026Adversarial Intent is a Latent Variable: Stateful Trust Inference for Securing Multimodal Agentic RAGcited by 2
- 2026SoK: When Safe Agents Fail Together: The Security of Multi Agent LLM Systemscited by 1
- 2026Beyond Component Testing: Validating Agentic AI Systemscited by 0
- 2026Beyond Scene Description: Multi-Agent Orchestration for Non-visual Access to Virtual Worldscited by 0
- 2026OptoAgent: A Trustworthy Multi-Agent Framework for Opportunistic Vision Micro-Screening in Classroom Environmentscited by 0
- 2026Resource-Optimized and Energy-Aware Agentic AI Framework Anchored on Blockchain for Secure Software Supply Chainscited by 0
- 2026Resource-Optimized and Energy-Aware Agentic AI Framework Anchored on Blockchain for Secure Software Supply Chains25 Sep 2026
- 2026OptoAgent: A Trustworthy Multi-Agent Framework for Opportunistic Vision Micro-Screening in Classroom Environments13 Sep 2026
- 2026Beyond Scene Description: Multi-Agent Orchestration for Non-visual Access to Virtual Worlds13 Sep 2026
- 2026SoK: When Safe Agents Fail Together: The Security of Multi Agent LLM Systems1 Sep 2026
- 2026Beyond Component Testing: Validating Agentic AI Systems31 Jul 2026
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation9 Jun 2026
- 2026Adversarial Intent is a Latent Variable: Stateful Trust Inference for Securing Multimodal Agentic RAG24 Feb 2026
- 2026SOK: A Taxonomy of Attack Vectors and Defense Strategies for Agentic Supply Chain Runtime23 Feb 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026An Experimental Evaluation of Multimodal Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic AI Frameworks
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