From Confounding to Learning: Dynamic Service Fee Pricing on Third-Party Platforms

We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only transacted quantities and prices can be observed, this presents a general demand learning problem under confounding. Mathematically, we develop an algorithm with optimal regret of TildeO(√TwedgeσS-2). Our results reveal that supply-side noise fundamentally affects the learnability of demand, leading to a phase transition in regret. Technically, we show that non-i.i.d. actions can serve as instrumental variables for learning demand. We also propose a novel homeomorphic construction that allows us to establish estimation bounds without assuming star-shapedness, providing the first efficiency guarantee for learning demand with deep neural networks. Finally, we use simulations and offline counterfactuals from Talabat and Lyft data to illustrate the potential revenue implications of our approach.