mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Topology Matters: Measuring Memory Leakage in Multi-Agent LLMs

arXiv 2512.04668 ↗First posted 4 Dec 2025cs.CR cs.AI cs.CLcited by 9

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Graph topology is a fundamental determinant of memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems, yet its effects remain poorly quantified. We introduce MAMA (Multi-Agent Memory Attack), a controlled evaluation framework for comparing topology-conditioned memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems. MAMA operates on synthetic documents containing labeled Personally Identifiable Information (PII) entities, from which we generate sanitized task instructions. We execute a two-phase protocol: Engram (seeding private information into a target agent's memory) and Resonance (multi-round interaction where an attacker attempts extraction). Over 10 rounds, we measure leakage using a two-stage recovery criterion that combines exact-match extraction with LLM-based inference over the attacker's final output. We evaluate six canonical topologies (complete, circle, chain, tree, star, star-ring) across n∈4,5,6, attacker-target placements, and base models. Results are consistent: denser connectivity, shorter attacker-target distance, and higher target centrality increase leakage; most leakage occurs in early rounds and then plateaus; model choice shifts absolute rates but preserves broad structural trends; spatiotemporal/location attributes leak more readily than identity credentials or regulated identifiers. We distill practical guidance for system design: favor sparse or hierarchical connectivity, maximize attacker-target separation, and restrict hub/shortcut pathways via topology-aware access control. Our code is available at https://github.com/llll121/mama-eval.

Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 5 of its 21 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Dec 2025.

Builds on

5 of 21 references.

Closest ancestors · 4

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Multi-Agent Systems Execute Arbitrary Malicious Code15 Mar
  2. 2025Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interaction5 Mar
  3. 2025Unveiling Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Memory17 Feb
  4. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul

Other references · 1

  1. 2024On the Resilience of LLM-Based Multi-Agent Collaboration with Faulty Agentscited by 92

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 9.

9 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Observable Channels, Not Just Storage: Evaluating Privacy Leakage in LLM Agent Pipelines
  2. 2026AgentLeak: A Benchmark for Internal-Channel Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
  3. 2026WebWeaver: Breaking Topology Confidentiality in LLM Multi-Agent Systems with Stealthy Context-Based Inference
  4. 2026Trust propagation and structural containment in Multi-agent LLM pipelines
  5. 2026CIPL: A Channel-Aware Framework for Recoverable Privacy Leakage in LLM Agents
  6. 2026MAPLE-Guard: Memory-Aware Link Enforcement Against Memory-Link Poisoning in Multi-Agent Systems
  7. 2026From Storage to Steering: Memory Control Flow Attacks on LLM Agents
  8. 2024NetSafe: Exploring the Topological Safety of Multi-agent Networks