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Fair Indivisible Payoffs through Shapley Value

arXiv 2510.24906 ↗First posted 28 Oct 2025cs.GT cs.AIcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

We consider the problem of payoff division in indivisible coalitional games, where the value of the grand coalition is a natural number. This number represents a certain quantity of indivisible objects, such as parliamentary seats, kidney exchanges, or top features contributing to the outcome of a machine learning model. The goal of this paper is to propose a fair method for dividing these objects among players. To achieve this, we define the indivisible Shapley value and study its properties. We demonstrate our proposed technique using three case studies, in particular, we use it to identify key regions of an image in the context of an image classification task.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 9 of its 33 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 Oct 2025.

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References · 9

  1. 2014ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challengecited by 8,441
  2. 2017A Unified Approach to Interpreting Model Predictionscited by 6,488
  3. 2019EfficientNet: Rethinking Model Scaling for Convolutional Neural Networkscited by 6,415
  4. 2020Towards Unifying Feature Attribution and Counterfactual Explanations: Different Means to the Same Endcited by 66
  5. 2020Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferencescited by 37
  6. 2023Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Votingcited by 23
  7. 2017Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goodscited by 8
  8. 2019Approval-Based Apportionmentcited by 8
  9. 2022The Complexity of Matching Games: A Surveycited by 2

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