mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Audit the Whisper: Detecting Steganographic Collusion in Multi-Agent LLMs

arXiv 2510.04303 ↗First posted 5 Oct 2025cs.MA cs.AIcited by 8

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Multi-agent deployments of large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in market, allocation, and governance workflows, yet covert coordination among agents can silently erode trust and social welfare. Existing audits are dominated by heuristics that lack theoretical guarantees, struggle to transfer across tasks, and seldom ship with the infrastructure needed for independent replication. We introduce Audit the Whisper, a conference-grade research artifact that spans theory, benchmark design, detection, and reproducibility. Our contributions are: (i) a channel-capacity analysis showing how interventions such as paraphrase, rate limiting, and role permutation impose quantifiable capacity penalties-operationalised via paired-run Kullback--Leibler diagnostics-that tighten mutual-information thresholds with finite-sample guarantees and full proofs; (ii) ColludeBench-v0, covering pricing, first-price auctions, peer review, and hosted Gemini/Groq APIs with configurable covert schemes, deterministic manifests, and reward instrumentation; and (iii) a calibrated auditing pipeline that fuses cross-run mutual information, permutation invariance, watermark variance, and fairness-aware acceptance bias, each tuned to a 10-3 false-positive budget and validated by 10k honest runs plus an e-value martingale. Across ColludeBench and external suites including Secret Collusion, CASE, Perfect Collusion Benchmark, and SentinelAgent, the union meta-test attains state-of-the-art power at fixed FPR while ablations surface price-of-auditing trade-offs and fairness-driven colluders invisible to MI alone. We release regeneration scripts, anonymized manifests, and documentation so that external auditors can reproduce every figure, satisfy double-blind requirements, and extend the framework with minimal effort.

Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 3 of its 19 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Oct 2025.

Builds on

3 of 19 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024Secret Collusion among AI Agents: Multi-Agent Deception via Steganography12 Feb

Other references · 2

  1. 2023A Watermark for Large Language Modelscited by 725
  2. 2018MINE: Mutual Information Neural Estimationcited by 683

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 8.

8 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Codetta: High-Capacity, Keyless, and Undetectable Multi-Agent Collusion
  2. 2026AgentLeak: A Benchmark for Internal-Channel Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
  3. 2026Beyond the Transcript: Detecting Covert Co ordination in Latent Multi-Agent Communication
  4. 2026Tool Use Enables Undetectable Steganography in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
  5. 2026DECOR: Auditing LLM Deception via Information Manipulation Theory
  6. 2026Voluntary Collusion with Secret Tools in Competing LLM Agents
  7. 2026Colosseum: Auditing Collusion in Cooperative Multi-Agent Systems
  8. 2026AgentProv: Auditing Agentic LLM API Providers via Tool-use Policy Probes