OpenAI's GPT-OSS-20B Model and Safety Alignment Issues in a Low-Resource Language
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks
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Abstract (arXiv)
In response to the recent safety probing for OpenAI's GPT-OSS-20b model, we present a summary of a set of vulnerabilities uncovered in the model, focusing on its performance and safety alignment in a low-resource language setting. The core motivation for our work is to question the model's reliability for users from underrepresented communities. Using Hausa, a major African language, we uncover biases, inaccuracies, and cultural insensitivities in the model's behaviour. With a minimal prompting, our red-teaming efforts reveal that the model can be induced to generate harmful, culturally insensitive, and factually inaccurate content in the language. As a form of reward hacking, we note how the model's safety protocols appear to relax when prompted with polite or grateful language, leading to outputs that could facilitate misinformation and amplify hate speech. For instance, the model operates on the false assumption that common insecticide locally known as Fiya-Fiya (Cyphermethrin) and rodenticide like Shinkafar Bera (a form of Aluminium Phosphide) are safe for human consumption. To contextualise the severity of this error and popularity of the substances, we conducted a survey (n=61) in which 98% of participants identified them as toxic. Additional failures include an inability to distinguish between raw and processed foods and the incorporation of demeaning cultural proverbs to build inaccurate arguments. We surmise that these issues manifest through a form of linguistic reward hacking, where the model prioritises fluent, plausible-sounding output in the target language over safety and truthfulness. We attribute the uncovered flaws primarily to insufficient safety tuning in low-resource linguistic contexts. By concentrating on a low-resource setting, our approach highlights a significant gap in current red-teaming effort and offer some recommendations.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 5 of its 9 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 Sep 2025.
Builds on
5 of 9 references.
References · 5
- 2025Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Thinkcited by 388
- 2024Alignment faking in large language modelscited by 316
- 2024AI Sandbagging: Language Models can Strategically Underperform on Evaluationscited by 131
- 2025Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluatedcited by 105
- 2025Fully Autonomous AI Agents Should Not be Developedcited by 43
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 1.
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- 2026Bridging the Multilingual Safety Divide: Efficient, Culturally-Aware Alignment for Global South Languages
- 2026ThaiSafetyBench: Assessing Language Model Safety in Thai Cultural Contexts
- 2026Can Safety Emerge from Weak Supervision? A Systematic Analysis of Small Language Models
- 2026LLM Safety Alignment in Low-Resource Languages: A Systematic Literature Review
- 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!
- 2024Emulated Disalignment: Safety Alignment for Large Language Models May Backfire!
- 2024Don't Command, Cultivate: An Exploratory Study of System-2 Alignment
- 2025Safe in the Future, Dangerous in the Past: Dissecting Temporal and Linguistic Vulnerabilities in LLMs