mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

OffTopicEval: When Large Language Models Enter the Wrong Chat, Almost Always!

arXiv 2509.26495 ↗First posted 30 Sep 2025cs.AIcited by 4

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Model (LLM) safety is one of the most pressing challenges for enabling wide-scale deployment. While most studies and global discussions focus on generic harms, such as models assisting users in harming themselves or others, enterprises face a more fundamental concern: whether LLM-based agents are safe for their intended use case. To address this, we introduce operational safety, defined as an LLM's ability to appropriately accept or refuse user queries when tasked with a specific purpose. We further propose OffTopicEval, an evaluation suite and benchmark for measuring operational safety both in general and within specific agentic use cases. Our evaluations on six model families comprising 20 open-weight LLMs reveal that while performance varies across models, all of them remain highly operationally unsafe. Even the strongest models - Qwen-3 (235B) with 77.77% and Mistral (24B) with 79.96% - fall far short of reliable operational safety, while GPT models plateau in the 62-73% range, Phi achieves only mid-level scores (48-70%), and Gemma and Llama-3 collapse to 39.53% and 23.84%, respectively. While operational safety is a core model alignment issue, to suppress these failures, we propose prompt-based steering methods: query grounding (Q-ground) and system-prompt grounding (P-ground), which substantially improve OOD refusal. Q-ground provides consistent gains of up to 23%, while P-ground delivers even larger boosts, raising Llama-3.3 (70B) by 41% and Qwen-3 (30B) by 27%. These results highlight both the urgent need for operational safety interventions and the promise of prompt-based steering as a first step toward more reliable LLM-based agents.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 20 of its 39 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Sep 2025.

Builds on

20 of 39 references.

References · 20

  1. 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,192
  2. 2020Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understandingcited by 7,768
  3. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
  4. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
  5. 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,326
  6. 2025Qwen3 Embedding: Advancing Text Embedding and Reranking Through Foundation Modelscited by 1,175
  7. 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!cited by 1,106
  8. 2023Steering Language Models With Activation Engineeringcited by 824
  9. 2024Phi-4 Technical Reportcited by 675
  10. 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 619
  11. 2025Phi-4-Mini Technical Report: Compact yet Powerful Multimodal Language Models via Mixture-of-LoRAscited by 491
  12. 2025Persona Vectors: Monitoring and Controlling Character Traits in Language Modelscited by 303
8 more
  1. 2023A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Generalized Nested Jailbreak Prompts can Fool Large Language Models Easilycited by 242
  2. 2024SORRY-Bench: Systematically Evaluating Large Language Model Safety Refusalcited by 224
  3. 2025AbstentionBench: Reasoning LLMs Fail on Unanswerable Questionscited by 129
  4. 2023AutoDAN: Interpretable Gradient-Based Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 102
  5. 2024Introducing v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark from MLCommonscited by 60
  6. 2024CoSafe: Evaluating Large Language Model Safety in Multi-Turn Dialogue Coreferencecited by 51
  7. 2024GASP: Efficient Black-Box Generation of Adversarial Suffixes for Jailbreaking LLMscited by 12
  8. 2023Adversarial Fine-Tuning of Language Models: An Iterative Optimisation Approach for the Generation and Detection of Problematic Contentcited by 7

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.

4 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents
  2. 2025A Comprehensive Survey in LLM(-Agent) Full Stack Safety: Data, Training and Deployment
  3. 2025Is Safety Standard Same for Everyone? User-Specific Safety Evaluation of Large Language Models
  4. 2024Large Language Model Safety: A Holistic Survey
  5. 2025SafetyFlow: An Agent-Flow System for Automated LLM Safety Benchmarking
  6. 2023All Languages Matter: On the Multilingual Safety of Large Language Models
  7. 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents
  8. 2025SafeLawBench: Towards Safe Alignment of Large Language Models