Takedown: How It's Done in Modern Coding Agent Exploits
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Coding agents, which are LLM-driven agents specialized in software development, have become increasingly prevalent in modern programming environments. Unlike traditional AI coding assistants, which offer simple code completion and suggestions, modern coding agents tackle more complex tasks with greater autonomy, such as generating entire programs from natural language instructions. To enable such capabilities, modern coding agents incorporate extensive functionalities, which in turn raise significant concerns over their security and privacy. Despite their growing adoption, systematic and in-depth security analysis of these agents has largely been overlooked. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of eight real-world coding agents. Our analysis addresses the limitations of prior approaches, which were often fragmented and ad hoc, by systematically examining the internal workflows of coding agents and identifying security threats across their components. Through the analysis, we identify 15 security issues, including previously overlooked or missed issues, that can be abused to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of user systems. Furthermore, we show that these security issues are not merely individual vulnerabilities, but can collectively lead to end-to-end exploitations. By leveraging these security issues, we successfully achieved arbitrary command execution in five agents and global data exfiltration in four agents, all without any user interaction or approval. Our findings highlight the need for a comprehensive security analysis in modern LLM-driven agents and demonstrate how insufficient security considerations can lead to severe vulnerabilities.
Key facts. Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 37 of its 67 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Sep 2025.
Builds on
37 of 67 references.
Closest ancestors · 13
Same direction, newest first
- 2025PromptArmor: Simple yet Effective Prompt Injection Defenses21 Jul
- 2025A Survey of LLM-Driven AI Agent Communication: Protocols, Security Risks, and Defense Countermeasures24 Jun
- 2025A Comprehensive Survey in LLM(-Agent) Full Stack Safety: Data, Training and Deployment22 Apr
- 2025MCP Guardian: A Security-First Layer for Safeguarding MCP-Based AI System17 Apr
- 2025A Survey on Trustworthy LLM Agents: Threats and Countermeasures12 Mar
- 2025Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interaction5 Mar
- 2025Commercial LLM Agents Are Already Vulnerable to Simple Yet Dangerous Attacks12 Feb
- 2024RedCode: Risky Code Execution and Generation Benchmark for Code Agents12 Nov
- 2024Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use19 Oct
- 2024Breaking Agents: Compromising Autonomous LLM Agents Through Malfunction Amplification30 Jul
- 2024The Emerged Security and Privacy of LLM Agent: A Survey with Case Studies28 Jul
- 2024AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents19 Jun
1 more
Other references · 24
- 2023A Survey on Large Language Model based Autonomous Agentscited by 2,242
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
- 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 605
- 2023SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attackscited by 469
- 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 375
- 2024PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Modelscited by 267
- 2025Model Context Protocol (MCP): Landscape, Security Threats, and Future Research Directionscited by 265
- 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 264
- 2022Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?cited by 192
- 2024AI Agents Under Threat: A Survey of Key Security Challenges and Future Pathwayscited by 127
- 2024LLM Hallucinations in Practical Code Generation: Phenomena, Mechanism, and Mitigationcited by 93
12 more
- 2024BadChain: Backdoor Chain-of-Thought Prompting for Large Language Modelscited by 80
- 2024SelfDefend: LLMs Can Defend Themselves against Jailbreaking in a Practical Mannercited by 63
- 2024InjecGuard: Benchmarking and Mitigating Over-defense in Prompt Injection Guardrail Modelscited by 42
- 2025Enterprise-Grade Security for the Model Context Protocol (MCP): Frameworks and Mitigation Strategiescited by 42
- 2025Vibe Coding vs. Agentic Coding: Fundamentals and Practical Implications of Agentic AIcited by 42
- 2024Defensive Prompt Patch: A Robust and Interpretable Defense of LLMs against Jailbreak Attackscited by 37
- 2025Poison-RAG: Adversarial Data Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation in Recommender Systemscited by 32
- 2024Using AI Assistants in Software Development: A Qualitative Study on Security Practices and Concernscited by 28
- 2025ASIDE: Architectural Separation of Instructions and Data in Language Modelscited by 24
- 2024Rapid Response: Mitigating LLM Jailbreaks with a Few Examplescited by 16
- 2024LLMGuard: Guarding Against Unsafe LLM Behaviorcited by 13
- 2024Developers Are Victims Too : A Comprehensive Analysis of The VS Code Extension Ecosystemcited by 4
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 5.
6 papers.
- 2026SEVerA: Verified Synthesis of Self-Evolving Agentscited by 8
- 2025LeechHijack: Covert Computational Resource Exploitation in Intelligent Agent Systemscited by 5
- 2026Agent-Fence: Mapping Security Vulnerabilities Across Deep Research Agentscited by 3
- 2026One Goal, Many Commands: Characterizing Denylist Fragility in AI Agentscited by 1
- 2026Red-Teaming the Agentic Red-Teamcited by 0
- 2026Beyond the Payload: How User Invocation Shapes Coding Agent Vulnerability to Repository Poisoningcited by 0
- 2026Beyond the Payload: How User Invocation Shapes Coding Agent Vulnerability to Repository Poisoning31 Aug 2026
- 2026Red-Teaming the Agentic Red-Team23 Jun 2026
- 2026One Goal, Many Commands: Characterizing Denylist Fragility in AI Agents14 Jun 2026
- 2026SEVerA: Verified Synthesis of Self-Evolving Agents26 Mar 2026
- 2026Agent-Fence: Mapping Security Vulnerabilities Across Deep Research Agents7 Feb 2026
- 2025LeechHijack: Covert Computational Resource Exploitation in Intelligent Agent Systems2 Dec 2025
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025Red-Teaming Coding Agents from a Tool-Invocation Perspective: An Empirical Security Assessment
- 2025When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis of Insecure Behaviors in LLM Coding Agents
- 2026Security in the Age of AI Teammates: An Empirical Study of Agentic Pull Requests on GitHub
- 2026IssueTrojanBench: Benchmarking AI Coding Agents Against Malicious Issue Requests
- 2025Analyzing Code Injection Attacks on LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems in Software Development
- 2026The Balkanization of Execution-Security Research for AI Coding Agents: Isolation, Access Control, and Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use Vulnerabilities
- 2026Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic Coding Assistants: A Systematic Analysis of Vulnerabilities in Skills, Tools, and Protocol Ecosystems
- 2024AutoSafeCoder: A Multi-Agent Framework for Securing LLM Code Generation through Static Analysis and Fuzz Testing