mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

LatentGuard: Controllable Latent Steering for Robust Refusal of Attacks and Reliable Response Generation

arXiv 2509.19839 ↗First posted 24 Sep 2025cs.AIcited by 1

On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks

also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)

Achieving robust safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) while preserving their utility remains a fundamental challenge. Existing approaches often struggle to balance comprehensive safety with fine-grained controllability at the representation level. We introduce LATENTGUARD, a novel three-stage framework that combines behavioral alignment with supervised latent space control for interpretable and precise safety steering. Our approach begins by fine-tuning an LLM on rationalized datasets containing both reasoning-enhanced refusal responses to adversarial prompts and reasoning-enhanced normal responses to benign queries, establishing robust behavioral priors across both safety-critical and utility-preserving scenarios. We then train a structured variational autoencoder (VAE) on intermediate MLP activations, supervised by multi-label annotations including attack types, attack methods, and benign indicators. This supervision enables the VAE to learn disentangled latent representations that capture distinct adversarial characteristics while maintaining semantic interpretability. Through targeted manipulation of learned latent dimensions, LATENTGUARD achieves selective refusal behavior, effectively blocking harmful requests while preserving helpfulness for legitimate use cases. Experiments on Qwen3-8B demonstrate significant improvements in both safety controllability and response interpretability without compromising utility. Cross-architecture validation on Mistral-7B confirms the generalizability of our latent steering approach, showing consistent effectiveness across different model families. Our results suggest that structured representation-level intervention offers a promising pathway toward building safer yet practical LLM systems.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 20 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Sep 2025.

Builds on

20 of 27 references.

Closest ancestors · 3

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Safety is Not Only About Refusal: Reasoning-Enhanced Fine-tuning for Interpretable LLM Safety6 Mar
  2. 2024SORRY-Bench: Systematically Evaluating Large Language Model Safety Refusal20 Jun
  3. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul

Other references · 17

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,712
  2. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 2,950
  3. 2023Sparse Autoencoders Find Highly Interpretable Features in Language Modelscited by 1,359
  4. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
  5. 2023Inference-Time Intervention: Eliciting Truthful Answers from a Language Modelcited by 1,259
  6. 2023Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparencycited by 1,239
  7. 2019An Introduction to Variational Autoencoderscited by 997
  8. 2024How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMscited by 533
  9. 2014Semi-Supervised Learning with Deep Generative Modelscited by 494
  10. 2024Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attackscited by 450
  11. 2017Toward Controlled Generation of Textcited by 271
  12. 2017Style Transfer from Non-Parallel Text by Cross-Alignmentcited by 246
5 more
  1. 2025AxBench: Steering LLMs? Even Simple Baselines Outperform Sparse Autoencoderscited by 199
  2. 2024Making Them Ask and Answer: Jailbreaking Large Language Models in Few Queries via Disguise and Reconstructioncited by 95
  3. 2024Steering Language Model Refusal with Sparse Autoencoderscited by 89
  4. 2018Learning Disentangled Joint Continuous and Discrete Representationscited by 83
  5. 2025Steering Large Language Model Activations in Sparse Spacescited by 58

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs
  2. 2025Probing the Robustness of Large Language Models Safety to Latent Perturbations
  3. 2025From Threat to Tool: Leveraging Refusal-Aware Injection Attacks for Safety Alignment
  4. 2025FalseReject: A Resource for Improving Contextual Safety and Mitigating Over-Refusals in LLMs via Structured Reasoning
  5. 2026Latent-space Attacks for Refusal Evasion in Language Models
  6. 2025Latent Fusion Jailbreak: Blending Harmful and Harmless Representations to Elicit Unsafe LLM Outputs
  7. 2026The Geometry of Refusal: Linear Instability in Safety-Aligned LLMs
  8. 2026Efficient Safety Alignment of Language Models via Latent Personality Traits