Game Theory in Social Media: A Stackelberg Model of Collaboration, Conflict, and Algorithmic Incentives

This research models the social media content creation and the choices that creators make as a Stackelberg game. The platform's algorithms, such as TikTok's and YouTube's, function as leaders, and they set rules to maximize users' engagement with their platforms. Then, content creators, who function as followers in this Stackelberg Game, respond to this by selecting strategies; in this instance, we are specifically focusing on collaboration or conflict, referred to in this paper as 'beefing.' They do this in order to maximize views and personal payoffs. The viewer's preferences are already placed within the algorithmic utility function, while the external sponsors will impose penalties on high-risk strategies, namely, beefing multiple times. This paper ultimately demonstrates, through the use of math, how shifts in algorithmic weights determine equilibrium creator behavior.