COSMIC: Generalized Refusal Direction Identification in LLM Activations
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large Language Models (LLMs) encode behaviors such as refusal within their activation space, yet identifying these behaviors remains a significant challenge. Existing methods often rely on predefined refusal templates detectable in output tokens or require manual analysis. We introduce COSMIC (Cosine Similarity Metrics for Inversion of Concepts), an automated framework for direction selection that identifies viable steering directions and target layers using cosine similarity - entirely independent of model outputs. COSMIC achieves steering performance comparable to prior methods without requiring assumptions about a model's refusal behavior, such as the presence of specific refusal tokens. It reliably identifies refusal directions in adversarial settings and weakly aligned models, and is capable of steering such models toward safer behavior with minimal increase in false refusals, demonstrating robustness across a wide range of alignment conditions.
Key facts. Cited by 19 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 37 of its 59 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 May 2025.
Builds on
37 of 59 references.
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25 more
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 4; 2026: 15.
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- 2025LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separatelycited by 88
- 2026A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Securitycited by 16
- 2025RepIt: Steering Language Models with Concept-Specific Refusal Vectorscited by 12
- 2026Steered LLM Activations are Non-Surjectivecited by 8
- 2025ARGUS: Defending Against Multimodal Indirect Prompt Injection via Steering Instruction-Following Behaviorcited by 7
- 2026Dynamic Adversarial Fine-Tuning Reorganizes Refusal Geometrycited by 2
- 2026Controlling Tool Use with Heading-Specific Activation Steeringcited by 2
- 2026Agent Security Needs Redefinition through a Holistic Frameworkcited by 2
- 2025Graph-Regularized Sparse Autoencoders for LLM Safety Steeringcited by 1
- 2026RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMscited by 1
- 2026Ablating Safety: Mechanisms for Removing Alignment in Language Models for Security Applicationscited by 1
- 2026Safe Transformer: An Explicit Safety Bit For Interpretable And Controllable Alignmentcited by 0
7 more
- 2026Decomposing Refusal Steering in Mixture-of-Experts Modelscited by 0
- 2026From Refusal Geometry to Safety Geometry: Harmfulness--Refusal Coupling under Dynamic Adversarial Fine-Tuningcited by 0
- 2026Harnessing Textual Refusal Directions for Multimodal Safetycited by 0
- 2026Fast Multi-dimensional Refusal Subspaces via RFM-AGOPcited by 0
- 2026WildSEEK: Evaluating Language Models for Information-Seekingcited by 0
- 2026Component and Dimension Sparsity in Transformer Refusal Mechanismscited by 0
- 2026Narrative Paradoxes in LLM Inference: Shaping Reasoning Trajectories toward Misalignmentcited by 0
- 2026Narrative Paradoxes in LLM Inference: Shaping Reasoning Trajectories toward Misalignment12 Oct 2026
- 2026Component and Dimension Sparsity in Transformer Refusal Mechanisms30 Sep 2026
- 2026WildSEEK: Evaluating Language Models for Information-Seeking31 Aug 2026
- 2026Agent Security Needs Redefinition through a Holistic Framework24 Jul 2026
- 2026Controlling Tool Use with Heading-Specific Activation Steering7 Jul 2026
- 2026Fast Multi-dimensional Refusal Subspaces via RFM-AGOP2 Jul 2026
- 2026Harnessing Textual Refusal Directions for Multimodal Safety30 Jun 2026
- 2026From Refusal Geometry to Safety Geometry: Harmfulness--Refusal Coupling under Dynamic Adversarial Fine-Tuning15 Jun 2026
- 2026Decomposing Refusal Steering in Mixture-of-Experts Models2 Jun 2026
- 2026Ablating Safety: Mechanisms for Removing Alignment in Language Models for Security Applications17 May 2026
- 2026RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs3 May 2026
- 2026Dynamic Adversarial Fine-Tuning Reorganizes Refusal Geometry29 Apr 2026
7 more
- 2026Steered LLM Activations are Non-Surjective10 Apr 2026
- 2026A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security19 Mar 2026
- 2026Safe Transformer: An Explicit Safety Bit For Interpretable And Controllable Alignment6 Mar 2026
- 2025Graph-Regularized Sparse Autoencoders for LLM Safety Steering7 Dec 2025
- 2025ARGUS: Defending Against Multimodal Indirect Prompt Injection via Steering Instruction-Following Behavior5 Dec 2025
- 2025RepIt: Steering Language Models with Concept-Specific Refusal Vectors16 Sep 2025
- 2025LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separately16 Jul 2025
- 2026Dynamic Adversarial Fine-Tuning Reorganizes Refusal Geometrycited by 2
- 2026RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMscited by 1
- 2026Ablating Safety: Mechanisms for Removing Alignment in Language Models for Security Applicationscited by 1
- 2026Safe Transformer: An Explicit Safety Bit For Interpretable And Controllable Alignmentcited by 0
- 2026Decomposing Refusal Steering in Mixture-of-Experts Modelscited by 0
- 2026From Refusal Geometry to Safety Geometry: Harmfulness--Refusal Coupling under Dynamic Adversarial Fine-Tuningcited by 0
- 2026From Refusal Geometry to Safety Geometry: Harmfulness--Refusal Coupling under Dynamic Adversarial Fine-Tuning15 Jun 2026
- 2026Decomposing Refusal Steering in Mixture-of-Experts Models2 Jun 2026
- 2026Ablating Safety: Mechanisms for Removing Alignment in Language Models for Security Applications17 May 2026
- 2026RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs3 May 2026
- 2026Dynamic Adversarial Fine-Tuning Reorganizes Refusal Geometry29 Apr 2026
- 2026Safe Transformer: An Explicit Safety Bit For Interpretable And Controllable Alignment6 Mar 2026
- 2025LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separatelycited by 88
- 2026Agent Security Needs Redefinition through a Holistic Frameworkcited by 2
- 2025Graph-Regularized Sparse Autoencoders for LLM Safety Steeringcited by 1
- 2026Agent Security Needs Redefinition through a Holistic Framework24 Jul 2026
- 2025Graph-Regularized Sparse Autoencoders for LLM Safety Steering7 Dec 2025
- 2025LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separately16 Jul 2025
- 2026A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Securitycited by 16
- 2026Controlling Tool Use with Heading-Specific Activation Steeringcited by 2
- 2026Controlling Tool Use with Heading-Specific Activation Steering7 Jul 2026
- 2026A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security19 Mar 2026
- 2026Steered LLM Activations are Non-Surjectivecited by 8
- 2026Component and Dimension Sparsity in Transformer Refusal Mechanismscited by 0
- 2026Component and Dimension Sparsity in Transformer Refusal Mechanisms30 Sep 2026
- 2026Steered LLM Activations are Non-Surjective10 Apr 2026
- 2026WildSEEK: Evaluating Language Models for Information-Seeking31 Aug 2026
- 2026Fast Multi-dimensional Refusal Subspaces via RFM-AGOP2 Jul 2026
- 2026Harnessing Textual Refusal Directions for Multimodal Safety30 Jun 2026
- 2025RepIt: Steering Language Models with Concept-Specific Refusal Vectors16 Sep 2025