Spa-VLM: Stealthy Poisoning Attacks on RAG-based VLM
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Abstract (arXiv)
With the rapid development of the Vision-Language Model (VLM), significant progress has been made in Visual Question Answering (VQA) tasks. However, existing VLM often generate inaccurate answers due to a lack of up-to-date knowledge. To address this issue, recent research has introduced Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) techniques, commonly used in Large Language Models (LLM), into VLM, incorporating external multi-modal knowledge to enhance the accuracy and practicality of VLM systems. Nevertheless, the RAG in LLM may be susceptible to data poisoning attacks. RAG-based VLM may also face the threat of this attack. This paper first reveals the vulnerabilities of the RAG-based large model under poisoning attack, showing that existing single-modal RAG poisoning attacks have a 100% failure rate in multi-modal RAG scenarios. To address this gap, we propose Spa-VLM (Stealthy Poisoning Attack on RAG-based VLM), a new paradigm for poisoning attacks on large models. We carefully craft malicious multi-modal knowledge entries, including adversarial images and misleading text, which are then injected into the RAG's knowledge base. When users access the VLM service, the system may generate misleading outputs. We evaluate Spa-VLM on two Wikipedia datasets and across two different RAGs. Results demonstrate that our method achieves highly stealthy poisoning, with the attack success rate exceeding 0.8 after injecting just 5 malicious entries into knowledge bases with 100K and 2M entries, outperforming state-of-the-art poisoning attacks designed for RAG-based LLMs. Additionally, we evaluated several defense mechanisms, all of which ultimately proved ineffective against Spa-VLM, underscoring the effectiveness and robustness of our attack.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 28 May 2025.
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 3; 2026: 7.
10 papers.
- 2025ADVEDM:Fine-grained Adversarial Attack against VLM-based Embodied Agentscited by 23
- 2025SegTrans: Transferable Adversarial Examples for Segmentation Modelscited by 8
- 2026Transferable Physical-World Adversarial Patches Against Pedestrian Detection Modelscited by 2
- 2025Dual-View Inference Attack: Machine Unlearning Amplifies Privacy Exposurecited by 1
- 2026Transferable Physical-World Adversarial Patches Against Object Detection in Autonomous Drivingcited by 1
- 2026Retrieved But Not Reliable: A Survey on Attacks, and Defenses in Retrieval-Augmented Generationcited by 1
- 2026VFACamou: View-Fused Adversarial Camouflage for Environment-Adaptive Physical Evasioncited by 0
- 2026Imperceptible and Reversible Adversarial Examples against Vision-Language Models for Privacy Protectioncited by 0
- 2026MemCatalyst: Amplifying Data Auditing on Vision-Language Models via Data Poisoningcited by 0
- 2026Vis-Poison: Poisoning Visual Knowledge in Multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Generationcited by 0
- 2026Retrieved But Not Reliable: A Survey on Attacks, and Defenses in Retrieval-Augmented Generation25 Aug 2026
- 2026Vis-Poison: Poisoning Visual Knowledge in Multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Generation21 Aug 2026
- 2026MemCatalyst: Amplifying Data Auditing on Vision-Language Models via Data Poisoning18 Aug 2026
- 2026Imperceptible and Reversible Adversarial Examples against Vision-Language Models for Privacy Protection11 Jul 2026
- 2026VFACamou: View-Fused Adversarial Camouflage for Environment-Adaptive Physical Evasion18 Jun 2026
- 2026Transferable Physical-World Adversarial Patches Against Object Detection in Autonomous Driving25 Apr 2026
- 2026Transferable Physical-World Adversarial Patches Against Pedestrian Detection Models24 Apr 2026
- 2025Dual-View Inference Attack: Machine Unlearning Amplifies Privacy Exposure18 Dec 2025
- 2025SegTrans: Transferable Adversarial Examples for Segmentation Models10 Oct 2025
- 2025ADVEDM:Fine-grained Adversarial Attack against VLM-based Embodied Agents20 Sep 2025
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- 2025CPA-RAG:Covert Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation in Large Language Models
- 2025One Pic is All it Takes: Poisoning Visual Document Retrieval Augmented Generation with a Single Image
- 2024Phantom: General Backdoor Attacks on Retrieval Augmented Language Generation
- 2025MM-PoisonRAG: Disrupting Multimodal RAG with Local and Global Poisoning Attacks
- 2025Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generation
- 2025Practical Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generation
- 2024BadRAG: Identifying Vulnerabilities in Retrieval Augmented Generation of Large Language Models
- 2025PR-Attack: Coordinated Prompt-RAG Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation in Large Language Models via Bilevel Optimization