mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Les Dissonances: Cross-Tool Harvesting and Polluting in Pool-of-Tools Empowered LLM Agents

arXiv 2504.03111 ↗First posted 4 Apr 2025cs.CRcited by 19

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are autonomous systems powered by LLMs, capable of reasoning and planning to solve problems by leveraging a set of tools. However, the integration of multi-tool capabilities in LLM agents introduces challenges in securely managing tools, ensuring their compatibility, handling dependency relationships, and protecting control flows within LLM agent workflows. In this paper, we present the first systematic security analysis of task control flows in multi-tool-enabled LLM agents. We identify a novel threat, Cross-Tool Harvesting and Polluting (XTHP), which includes multiple attack vectors to first hijack the normal control flows of agent tasks, and then collect and pollute confidential or private information within LLM agent systems. To understand the impact of this threat, we developed Chord, a dynamic scanning tool designed to automatically detect real-world agent tools susceptible to XTHP attacks. Our evaluation of 66 real-world tools from the repositories of two major LLM agent development frameworks, LangChain and LlamaIndex, revealed a significant security concern: 75% are vulnerable to XTHP attacks, highlighting the prevalence of this threat.

Key facts. Cited by 19 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 20 of its 72 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Apr 2025.

Builds on

20 of 72 references.

Closest ancestors · 10

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Design24 Mar
  2. 2024Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use19 Oct
  3. 2024EIA: Environmental Injection Attack on Generalist Web Agents for Privacy Leakage17 Sep
  4. 2024The Emerged Security and Privacy of LLM Agent: A Survey with Case Studies28 Jul
  5. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
  6. 2024AirGapAgent: Protecting Privacy-Conscious Conversational Agents8 May
  7. 2024IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systems8 Mar
  8. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
  9. 2024A Trembling House of Cards? Mapping Adversarial Attacks against Language Agents15 Feb
  10. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 10

  1. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
  2. 2022WebShop: Towards Scalable Real-World Web Interaction with Grounded Language Agentscited by 1,197
  3. 2024Justice or Prejudice? Quantifying Biases in LLM-as-a-Judgecited by 354
  4. 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 325
  5. 2022RealTime QA: What's the Answer Right Now?cited by 239
  6. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 233
  7. 2023MetaTool Benchmark for Large Language Models: Deciding Whether to Use Tools and Which to Usecited by 209
  8. 2024Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attack to LLM-as-a-Judgecited by 123
  9. 2024Measuring and Controlling Instruction (In)Stability in Language Model Dialogscited by 51
  10. 2023LLM Platform Security: Applying a Systematic Evaluation Framework to OpenAI's ChatGPT Pluginscited by 49

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 19.

19 papers.

Sort:

  1. 2026From Storage to Steering: Memory Control Flow Attacks on LLM Agentscited by 17
  2. 2026A Systematic Survey of Security Threats and Defenses in LLM-Based AI Agents: A Layered Attack Surface Frameworkcited by 9
  3. 2026On Protecting Agentic Systems' Intellectual Property via Watermarkingcited by 7
  4. 2026SkillMutator: Benchmarking and Defending Language-and-Code Cross-modal Attacks on LLM Agent Skillscited by 5
  5. 2026Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 4
  6. 2026When Child Inherits: Modeling and Exploiting Subagent Spawn in Multi-Agent Networkscited by 2
  7. 2026Demystifying and Detecting Agentic Workflow Injection Vulnerabilities in GitHub Actionscited by 1
  8. 2026Misleading the Planner through Deceptive Resumes: Registration-Time Injection in Centralized Multi-Agent Systemscited by 1
  9. 2026Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliabilitycited by 0
  10. 2026WebMCP Tool Surface Poisoning: Runtime Manipulation Attacks on LLM Agentscited by 0
  11. 2026DualView: Preventing Indirect Prompt Injection in Personal AI Agentscited by 0
  12. 2026LoginTrap: Uncovering Task-Agnostic Phishing-Style Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks against LLM-based Web Agentscited by 0
7 more
  1. 2026WebMCP-Phalanx: Enforcing and Characterizing Trust Boundaries for Browser-Integrated LLM Agentscited by 0
  2. 2026SPA: Securing Persistent LLM Agents Across Queries with Plan-First Information-Flow Controlcited by 0
  3. 2026Scanning the Harness: A Repository Study of Configuration Exposures in AI Coding Agentscited by 0
  4. 2026Confuse the Model, Control the Flow: Understanding and Mitigating Privacy Leakage from LLM Agents with Information Flow Controlcited by 0
  5. 2026A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Quality Assurance Practices and Gaps in AI Agentscited by 0
  6. 2026Measuring and Exploiting Implicit Trust in LLM Tool-Calling Pipelinescited by 0
  7. 2026Stealth Apart, Harm Together: Skill Cascading Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systemscited by 0

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
  2. 2025From Prompt Injections to Protocol Exploits: Threats in LLM-Powered AI Agents Workflows
  3. 2026Hybrid Analysis for Secure MCP Tool Use in LLM Agents
  4. 2026Think Twice Before You Act: Protecting LLM Agents Against Tool Description Poisoning via Isolated Planning
  5. 2025MCP Security Bench (MSB): Benchmarking Attacks Against Model Context Protocol in LLM Agents
  6. 2025ToolTweak: An Attack on Tool Selection in LLM-based Agents
  7. 2026ChainFuzzer: Greybox Fuzzing for Workflow-Level Multi-Tool Vulnerabilities in LLM Agents
  8. 2025Attractive Metadata Attack: Inducing LLM Agents to Invoke Malicious Tools