Tricking Retrievers with Influential Tokens: An Efficient Black-Box Corpus Poisoning Attack
On the map: Retrieval-augmented generation → Privacy and security of RAG
Abstract (arXiv)
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models by incorporating external knowledge, addressing issues like outdated internal knowledge and hallucination. However, their reliance on external knowledge bases makes them vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks, where adversarial passages can be injected to manipulate retrieval results. Existing methods for crafting such passages, such as random token replacement or training inversion models, are often slow and computationally expensive, requiring either access to retriever's gradients or large computational resources. To address these limitations, we propose Dynamic Importance-Guided Genetic Algorithm (DIGA), an efficient black-box method that leverages two key properties of retrievers: insensitivity to token order and bias towards influential tokens. By focusing on these characteristics, DIGA dynamically adjusts its genetic operations to generate effective adversarial passages with significantly reduced time and memory usage. Our experimental evaluation shows that DIGA achieves superior efficiency and scalability compared to existing methods, while maintaining comparable or better attack success rates across multiple datasets.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation. Builds on 21 of its 37 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 27 Mar 2025.
Builds on
21 of 37 references.
Closest ancestors · 2
Same direction, newest first
- 2024Typos that Broke the RAG's Back: Genetic Attack on RAG Pipeline by Simulating Documents in the Wild via Low-level Perturbations22 Apr
- 2024The Good and The Bad: Exploring Privacy Issues in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)23 Feb
Other references · 19
- 2020Language Models are Few-Shot Learnerscited by 32,419
- 2023GPT-4 Technical Reportcited by 18,396
- 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,715
- 2020Dense Passage Retrieval for Open-Domain Question Answeringcited by 3,824
- 2023Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Large Language Models: A Surveycited by 2,212
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2020Approximate Nearest Neighbor Negative Contrastive Learning for Dense Text Retrievalcited by 849
- 2021Large Dual Encoders Are Generalizable Retrieverscited by 456
- 2020SPECTER: Document-level Representation Learning using Citation-informed Transformerscited by 430
- 2023EvoPrompt: Connecting LLMs with Evolutionary Algorithms Yields Powerful Prompt Optimizerscited by 193
- 2023Text Embeddings Reveal (Almost) As Much As Textcited by 192
- 2023Can LLM-Generated Misinformation Be Detected?cited by 177
7 more
- 2023Poisoning Retrieval Corpora by Injecting Adversarial Passagescited by 159
- 2023Language Model Crossover: Variation through Few-Shot Promptingcited by 122
- 2024Semantic Mirror Jailbreak: Genetic Algorithm Based Jailbreak Prompts Against Open-source LLMscited by 53
- 2020Adversarial Semantic Collisionscited by 42
- 2022Order-Disorder: Imitation Adversarial Attacks for Black-box Neural Ranking Modelscited by 37
- 2020One word at a time: adversarial attacks on retrieval modelscited by 23
- 2023Resources for Brewing BEIR: Reproducible Reference Models and an Official Leaderboardcited by 15
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 5; 2026: 5.
10 papers.
- 2025False Sense of Security: Why Probing-based Malicious Input Detection Fails to Generalizecited by 19
- 2025TopicAttack: An Indirect Prompt Injection Attack via Topic Transitioncited by 17
- 2026Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systemscited by 16
- 2025MIRAGE: Misleading Retrieval-Augmented Generation via Black-box and Query-agnostic Poisoning Attackscited by 4
- 2026Securing Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Taxonomy of Attacks, Defenses, and Future Directionscited by 2
- 2025MillStone: How Open-Minded Are LLMs?cited by 1
- 2026Retrieved But Not Reliable: A Survey on Attacks, and Defenses in Retrieval-Augmented Generationcited by 1
- 2025Bounding Hallucinations: Merlin-Arthur Protocols for Mutual-Information Bounds in Language Modelscited by 0
- 2026Beyond Explicit Refusals: Soft-Failure Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generationcited by 0
- 2026Led to Mislead: Adversarial Content Injection for Attacks on Neural Ranking Modelscited by 0
- 2026Retrieved But Not Reliable: A Survey on Attacks, and Defenses in Retrieval-Augmented Generation25 Aug 2026
- 2026Led to Mislead: Adversarial Content Injection for Attacks on Neural Ranking Models2 May 2026
- 2026Beyond Explicit Refusals: Soft-Failure Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation20 Apr 2026
- 2026Securing Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Taxonomy of Attacks, Defenses, and Future Directions9 Apr 2026
- 2026Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems11 Jan 2026
- 2025Bounding Hallucinations: Merlin-Arthur Protocols for Mutual-Information Bounds in Language Models12 Dec 2025
- 2025MIRAGE: Misleading Retrieval-Augmented Generation via Black-box and Query-agnostic Poisoning Attacks9 Dec 2025
- 2025MillStone: How Open-Minded Are LLMs?15 Sep 2025
- 2025False Sense of Security: Why Probing-based Malicious Input Detection Fails to Generalize4 Sep 2025
- 2025TopicAttack: An Indirect Prompt Injection Attack via Topic Transition18 Jul 2025
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2024On the Vulnerability of Applying Retrieval-Augmented Generation within Knowledge-Intensive Application Domains
- 2025RAGPart & RAGMask: Retrieval-Stage Defenses Against Corpus Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation
- 2025NeuroGenPoisoning: Neuron-Guided Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation of LLM via Genetic Optimization of External Knowledge
- 2025Token-Level Precise Attack on RAG: Searching for the Best Alternatives to Mislead Generation
- 2025CPA-RAG:Covert Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation in Large Language Models
- 2026RAG-NAROK: Retrieval-Aware Knowledge Corpus Poisoning in RAG with Source-specific Refutation
- 2026ProGRank: Probe-Gradient Reranking to Defend Dense-Retriever RAG from Corpus Poisoning
- 2024Towards More Robust Retrieval-Augmented Generation: Evaluating RAG Under Adversarial Poisoning Attacks